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Internal Revenue Service
Attn: CC:PA:LPD:PR (Notice 2018-43) Room 5203
P.O. Box 7604
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, D.C. 20044
Re: Notice 2018-43, 2018-2019 Priority
Guidance Plan
Dear Sir or Madam:
The undersigned, Jeff Kadet and David Koontz, are both retired CPAs who have worked
internationally for many years. Based on our prior working experience and in connection
with some recent articles we have written, we have identified several projects that should
be considered a high priority for the Treasury and the IRS. These projects, which are
attached as appendices to this letter, cover a number of areas.
Notice 2018-43 lists factors that the Treasury and the IRS consider in selecting projects
for inclusion in its 2018-2019 Priority Guidance Plan. They include, for example,
whether a project (i) involves significant issues relevant to many taxpayers, (ii) will
reduce controversy and lessen the burden on taxpayers or the IRS, and (iii) promotes
sound tax administration. All of the suggestions for projects that we are submitting more
than satisfy all of these factors. More specifically, the effect of issuing new and/or
1

amended regulations as well as publishing guidance in these areas could result in
hundreds of billions of dollars of additional tax revenues through:
•

Encouraging MNCs to unwind existing profit shifting structures that violate not
only the spirit of the tax law but also its letter, as well as discouraging the
formation of new profit shifting structures, and

•

Enabling the government to effectively and efficiently contest such aggressive
profit shifting structures.

A principal focus of our suggestions is the modernization and updating of regulations as
well as providing guidance that will affect the many multinational corporations (MNCs)
whose operations take place partially or wholly within the U.S. Many of these MNCs
have embarked on complicated and legalistic schemes whose primary purpose is to shift
profits without any real operational changes and to record those profits within zero- and
low-taxed foreign members. Importantly, this includes not only U.S.-based MNCs, but
also the many inverted MNCs that structured their inversions to remain untouched by the
§7874 anti-inversion rules.
The government has expended efforts and significant resources attempting to attack a
multitude of MNC profit shifting structures. These efforts are labor intensive, time
consuming, and have uncertain outcomes. Such attacks have relied on either transfer
pricing (e.g. Microsoft, Amazon, Facebook, etc.) or re-characterization adjustments (e.g.
Caterpillar, Perrigo, etc.). These approaches, which have high costs for the government
and taxpayers alike, are so subjective in nature and application that litigated decisions
are little better than a toss-up. Edward Kleinbard, a noted tax law professor at the
University of Southern California, commented the following after the Amazon Tax Court
decision:
Regardless of the correctness of the decision on the merits, cases like this -costing millions of dollars to litigate, featuring 30 expert witnesses battling one
another, and decided through a 200 page opinion -- are symptomatic of an
unadministrable international tax system.1
The recent Tax Cuts and Jobs Act has made few improvements in this regard because it
still provides an up to ten-percentage point or higher incentive to shift profits out of the
U.S. (often a 21% benefit for foreign-owned MNCs). Included in the attached appendices
are suggestions that the IRS use the Code’s existing effectively connected income (ECI)
rules as a tool in combating profit shifting and base erosion. Today, the Treasury and the
IRS already have the full authority to modernize and focus the relevant regulations in a
manner that would support application of the ECI rules to many MNC profit shifting
schemes, thereby giving the IRS another and more effective means to tax this shifted
income. Where the facts support it, imposition of ECI taxation may prove to be more
objective and easier to sustain than either transfer pricing or re-characterization
adjustments.

Richard Rubin and Laura Stevens, “Banking & Finance: Amazon Defeats IRS in Tax
Case”, Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition, New York, N.Y., March 24, 2017.
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The issuance by the Treasury and the IRS of modernized sourcing and ECI regulations
along with our entity classification and other suggestions focused on profit shifting
structures would provide clarity for both MNC taxpayers and the IRS.2 In addition, clear
guidance would force outside audit firms to require their clients to make more
meaningful disclosures of their potential tax liabilities or to actually accrue tax, interest,
and penalties where some clients have inappropriately pushed the envelope in their profit
shifting structures. This would be further helped by the IRS designating tax motivated
structures having relevant factual, profit shifting characteristics as a “listed transaction”.
The undersigned either together or separately have authored six articles covering how
various MNC profit-shifting structures may well be subject to U.S. taxation under the
effectively connected income (ECI) rules.3 The third of these articles details how such
structures often create an unanticipated partnership for U.S. tax purposes that includes
two or more MNC group members as partners in a partnership that conducts the joint
business of the group members. An unanticipated partnership is important not only due to
the applicable tax return filing obligations and §1446 withholding, but also due to the fact
that a partnership simply makes the application of ECI taxation much easier. The sixth
article notes how the manufacturing branch rule included in the Subpart F regulations
may often apply to cause some gross income not caught by the ECI rules to be subpart F
income. Additional background and issues relevant to suggestions made within this letter
and its appendices are covered in detail in those articles.
Although not specifically related to the profit shifting structures that the six articles deal
with, many MNCs erode the U.S. tax base through deductible payments by U.S. group
These high priority regulation projects (with perhaps the sole exception of the TCJA
change to the §863(b) sourcing rule) represent only modernization and clarification of
existing rules that are already sufficiently broad to apply ECI taxation and partnership
status to many profit shifting structures. Importantly, the Treasury and IRS should make
clear that these rules will apply where the facts support them to any tax year whether
before or after the issuance of new or amended regulations.
3
1. Jeffery M. Kadet, “Attacking Profit Shifting: The Approach Everyone Forgets”, 148
Tax Notes 193 (July 13, 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2636073.
2. Thomas J. Kelley, David L. Koontz, and Jeffery Kadet, "Profit Shifting: Effectively
Connected Income and Financial Statement Risks”, 221(2) Journal of Accountancy 48
(February 2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2728157.
3. Jeffery M. Kadet and David L. Koontz, “Profit-Shifting Structures and Unexpected
Partnership Status”, 151 Tax Notes 335 (April 18, 2016), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2773574.
4. Jeffery M. Kadet and David L. Koontz, “Profit-Shifting Structures: Making Ethical
Judgments Objectively,” Part 1 at 151 Tax Notes 1831 (June 27, 2016) and Part 2 at 152
Tax Notes 85 (July 4, 2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2811267 and
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2811280.
5. Jeffery M. Kadet and David L. Koontz, “Internet Platform Companies and Base
Erosion--Issue and Solution,” Tax Notes, Dec. 4, 2017, p. 1435, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3096925.
6. Jeffery M. Kadet and David L. Koontz, “Effects of New Sourcing Rule: ECI and Profit
Shifting”, Tax Notes, May 21, 2018, p. 1119, copy attached as Appendix G.
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members to foreign group members, including DRE subsidiaries. Often, these payments
would be subject to the 30% U.S. withholding tax, but this tax is most typically reduced
or eliminated by the claimed coverage of a tax treaty. The same is true for nonwithholding tax claims such as a claim by a foreign group member that it has no
permanent establishment under an applicable tax treaty. Appendix F provides specific
guidance for needed regulatory amendments that would prevent the inappropriate use of
tax treaties to achieve double non-taxation.
As a final comment, we believe that if the Treasury and the IRS were to make clear their
intentions to pursue profit shifting structures through Notices, revenue rulings, or
regulations, as appropriate, that would undoubtedly put all MNCs and their legal and tax
advisors on “notice" to take potential partnership status and ECI taxation seriously. Also,
if the IRS were to find as a part of its audit of just one MNC an unanticipated partnership
for U.S. tax purposes, and impose significant ECI taxation, interest, and penalties, that
information would undoubtedly be disclosed in the MNCs public SEC filings.4 From the
moment of this "notice" becoming public (or an official notice from the IRS or Treasury),
many MNCs, which have fact patterns under which it is “more likely than not" that
partnership status and ECI taxation apply, would be required by their auditors to reflect
additional disclosures and taxes in their financial statements. Further, some of these
MNCs will determine that they must file Form 1120-F for the current and certain prior
years and will voluntarily pay tax on their ECI.5
Perhaps more importantly, any such “notice” will cause many MNC boards of directors
and managements to re-think their aggressive profit-shifting structures and should result
in significantly increased corporate tax payments with less profits ending up in tax
havens.
Note that any such “notice” would achieve one of the stated goals of the "Form 1120-F
Non-Filer Campaign” released on January 31, 2017. That campaign states, in part:
… The goal is to increase voluntary compliance by foreign corporations with a
U.S. business nexus.

*

*

*

*

*

Public companies such as Microsoft, Caterpillar, Coca Cola, and Facebook have
included in their SEC filings disclosures of IRS transfer pricing and re-characterization
adjustments. See, for example, page A-30 of the Caterpillar Inc. Form 10-K for its year
ended December 31, 2014, filed February 17, 2015.
5
See in particular the article “Profit Shifting: Effectively Connected Income and
Financial Statement Risks”, which is included as article 2 in the listing within footnote 3.
4
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We hope that the above information is useful to the Treasury and the IRS. Either of us
would be glad to speak by telephone with you or to respond to emailed questions if that
would be helpful.
Very truly yours,

Jeffery M. Kadet
(206) 395-9849
jeffkadet@gmail.com

David L. Koontz
(773) 315-7660
dlkoontz@aol.com

Attached Appendices
Appendix A – Modernization of Sourcing of Income and Effectively Connected Income
Regulations (Regulations under §§861 - 864)
Appendix B – Amendment of Reg §301.7701-1(a)(2) and/or Issuance of Revenue Ruling
on Partnership Status for Certain Profit-Shifting Structures
Appendix C – Designate Certain MNC Profit-Shifting Structures as Listed Transactions
Appendix D – Profit-Shifting Structures Implemented Following Inversions and
Acquisitions by Foreign Acquirers
Appendix E – Addition of Examples to the Manufacturing Branch Rule
Appendix F – Regulatory and Ruling Guidance Concerning Tax Treaties
Appendix G - Jeffery M. Kadet and David L. Koontz, “Effects of New Sourcing Rule:
ECI and Profit Shifting”, Tax Notes, May 21, 2018, p. 1119.
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APPENDIX A
Modernization of Sourcing of Income and Effectively Connected Income (ECI)
Regulations (Regulations under §§861 - 864)
Problem: Existing income sourcing and ECI regulations are sufficient to determine,
calculate, and impose ECI taxation for traditional (old) businesses but lack clarity when
applied to new business models prevalent in the 21st century. These include large MNCs
that depend on the use of digital and internet tools in their centrally managed worldwide
business models (e.g. high-tech manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies, internet-based
companies earning advertising and commission income, etc.). The existing regulations
need modernization to provide the IRS with another and even more effective tool to use
against profit-shifting structures. Currently, the IRS’s primary tools to reverse profitshifting structures have been transfer pricing and re-characterization, both tools that are
very subjective to apply and uncertain of success in the complex litigation that inevitably
follows. Modernizing the rules for applying ECI taxation would hopefully encourage
taxpayers to avoid aggressive structures and effectively add another enforcement tool for
the IRS to apply and sustain due to ECI’s more objective, fact-based criteria.
Solution: It is critical that sourcing and ECI regulations be updated to reflect modern-day
business models such as supply chains, contract manufacturers, etc. Moreover, updating
these regulations and making them consistent with other parts of the Code and
regulations would make ECI taxation easier for both taxpayers and the IRS to apply.
Failing to up-date these regulations will likely result in situations where ECI taxation
should apply but which may go unrecognized by taxpayers, outside auditors, and the IRS.
Regarding specific regulations to be modernized, the Reg. §1.864-6 rules (regarding sales
of goods or merchandise through a U.S. office of a foreign taxpayer) focus closely on the
sales contract and not on the many critical activities, often performed within the United
States by related persons, that strongly support not only consummated sales but critical
purchase and/or production functions. For example, many profit shifting structures start
with the transfer of production intangibles to a zero- or low-taxed foreign group member
that itself has no personnel or capacity to:
•

Conduct production through its own facilities;

•

Direct production physically performed by a contract manufacturer;

•

Control the risks associated with production or the holding of the production
intangibles.

Capacity to carry out these functions remains within one or more U.S. group members
that act on behalf of the foreign group member. These U.S. group members conduct
production operations, make day-to-day business decisions, and manage production risk
for that foreign member. Such operations and decisions can include the contractual terms
of agreements signed by the foreign member with component suppliers, raw material
vendors, and contract manufacturers. It also includes decisions on production processes,
production quantities, quality control, etc. Such functions and activities, and the
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commercial risks that arise from them, are a crucial and critical part of any manufacturing
business.
This sort of profit shifting structure, voluntarily created by many MNCs seeking to shift
profits into zero- or low-taxed foreign group members, creates solely in legal form an
independent company that produces products and sells them. Most or all production
functions (short of the physical manufacture that is performed by a usually unrelated
contract manufacturer) are performed by group members in the U.S., which are
ostensibly acting as independent contractors under a service agreement and not as an
agent, joint venturer, or partner.
Modernization of the §§861-864 regulations is needed to reflect the reality that U.S.
group members are performing critical production functions and making day-to-day
business decisions that control the potential profitability of and commercial risks borne
by the foreign group member. Such modernization could include:6
•

Meaning of “Produced”
Reg §1.864-1 should be amended to read:
For purposes of sections 1.861-1 through 1.864-7, the word "sale"
includes "exchange"; the word "sold" includes "exchanged"; the word
"produced" includes "created", "fabricated", "manufactured", "extracted",
"processed", "cured", "aged", and activities that constitute a substantial
contribution (within the meaning of section 1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)) to the
manufacture, production, or construction of personal property through the
activities of a taxpayer’s employees, agents, and related persons (within
the meaning of section 1.954-1(f)).

•

Clarity of Engaged in Trade or Business within the United States
Reg §1.864-2 should be amended to clarify that a foreign taxpayer having no
capacity or personnel to conduct all or any material portion of its business or to
manage the commercial risks of all or any material portion of its business will be
engaged in trade or business within the U.S. when those functions or management
of risks are conducted by one or more persons within the U.S. Such persons
include not only agents of the foreign taxpayer, but also putative independent
contractors (whether related or not) acting under a service or similar agreement.
The following should be added at the end of paragraph (a) of Reg §1.864-2:
The term also includes the performance of activities within the United
States (for example the purchasing or production of products, the
substantial contribution to the manufacturing of personal property within
the meaning of section 1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)(b), the sale of products, the
maintenance and management of an internet-based platform through

The suggested modernizations included below assume the present regulation structure
under §864 that have not yet been updated to reflect the addition of §865 and, in
particular, §865(e)(2), which causes relevant sales of personal property to be U.S. source
and therefore ECI under §864(c)(3) rather than foreign source and, as a result, covered by
§864(c)(4)(B)(iii).
6
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which sales are made or advertising or other internet based service
revenues are earned, the rental or licensing of intangibles, etc.) by another
person (whether related or not and including activities performed under
any independent contractor service agreement or agency) who conducts all
or any material portion of these activities or manages the commercial risks
thereof for or on behalf of any taxpayer when the taxpayer itself has
insufficient personnel or capacity to conduct all or any material portion of
its business or manage the commercial risks thereof. The actual conduct
and activities of the persons will control rather than any contractual label
or description that provides, for example, that the person conducting the
activities or managing the commercial risk is an independent contractor
providing a service.
•

Gross Income from Internet-Based Platforms
Many MNCs and other taxpayers conduct centrally managed worldwide
businesses that involve the provision of digital goods and services. At the core of
these businesses are the central ongoing decision-making concerning the business
being conducted and the day-to-day maintenance and management of the internet
platforms that are accessed by users globally. For many MNCs, these platforms
were not only developed primarily within the U.S., but both the ongoing decisionmaking and the platform maintenance and management are also conducted
mostly, if not wholly, within the U.S. While users (including advertisers) from a
particular country, territory, or region may access a platform presented in their
local language with some localization of the products or services offered, the
platform and the digital goods and services offered are virtually the same
worldwide. It is MNC personnel located in the U.S. who maintain and manage
these worldwide platforms and are the decision makers with regard to matters
such as the products or services to be offered, the terms on which they will be
offered including pricing, etc.
These digital goods and services include providing advertisers and others with
access to the MNC’s user base and information about users. They also include
without limitation providing platforms for gig economy workers (e.g. ride
sharing), acting as agents selling the products of others (e.g. software and nonphysical products like ebooks, music, movies, etc.), and providing cloud services.
For some years now, the regularly issued Priority Guidance Plan has included a
project focused on the sourcing and character of income related to digital goods
and services. The most recent quarterly update issued on May 9, 2018, of the
2017-2018 Priority Guidance Plan in the International section on page 23 at F.2.
states:
Regulations under §861 on the character of income, including income
arising in transactions involving intellectual property and the provision of
digital goods and services.
The authors of this submission have no information of what is being considered
for these future regulations. However, we believe that where an internet platform
and the business being conducted are primarily maintained and managed from
8

within the U.S., future regulations will likely provide that some material portion
of the revenue generated will be U.S. source gross income, irrespective of where
in the world the user, advertiser, or customer may be.
For prior and current years until these contemplated regulations are issued, source
of income will be based on the existing regulations, IRS rulings, other IRS
pronouncements, and case law. While there of course can be arguments made for
specific taxpayer situations regarding the character of income and the source rule
to be used, it seems that often the facts and circumstances approach of Reg
§1.861-4(b)(1) will be the most appropriate sourcing rule to apply. Where this is
the case, the day-to-day U.S.-based maintenance and management of the group’s
business and internet platform will cause material amounts of U.S. source income,
again irrespective of where in the world the user, advertiser, or other customer
may be.
Many MNC profit shifting structures involve the license or transfer of IP created
primarily within the U.S. to zero- or low-taxed foreign group members. Such
transactions provide the basis for the foreign group members to record revenues
generated by the internet platform from digital goods and services. A transfer
often involves first an ownership transfer of existing IP along with a cost sharing
agreement that allows the group member participants to own their respective
shares of future IP development for exploitation within their respective
geographic areas.
The foreign group member licenses or owns its IP, but it participates minimally, if
at all, in the actual operation of the internet platform through which it earns its
revenues from digital goods and services. Rather, one or more U.S. group
members conduct within the U.S. the bulk or all of the maintenance and
management of the business and platform for foreign group members (including
management of risk of the group’s investment in the platform), presumably under
a service or similar agreement. The foreign group member’s personnel (including
the employees of any disregarded entity subsidiaries) are typically involved in
marketing, customer support, logistics, and similar activities. They normally have
neither the knowledge nor the capacity to participate in maintaining and managing
the platform or in managing the risk of the IP they license or own. Further, they
do not have the capability of directing an independent service provider to perform
these functions and manage these risks.
In these circumstances, note that under Reg §1.482-7(j)(3)(i), cost sharing
transaction payments will be considered the payor's costs of developing
intangibles at the location where such development is conducted. Reg §1.4827(j)(2)(ii) provides that a foreign participant in a cost sharing agreement will not
be treated as engaged in trade or business within the U.S. solely by reason of its
participation in a CSA. However, if other factors create a trade or business within
the U.S., the paragraph (j)(3)(i) characterization rule means that the foreign
participant is considered to directly own a share of an intangible asset (the internet
platform) that is maintained and managed on a day-to-day basis within the U.S.
This means that the existing regulations characterize the foreign participant as
earning gross income from “directly-owned” assets that are part of an active
9

business being managed and conducted within the U.S. This characterization
further supports that there must be some material amount of U.S. source income.
Under the first bullet point above, we have suggested a change to Reg §1.864-2(a)
that would make clear that a foreign group member earning gross income from
digital goods and services through an internet platform that is maintained and
managed within the U.S. as described within this bullet point will be engaged in
trade or business within the United States. We suggest that the following
Example (4) be added to Reg §1.864-4(b) to make clear that any U.S. source
income earned by such a foreign group member would be effectively connected
income.
Example (4). In 2005, U.S. Parent (USP) and its wholly owned Foreign
Subsidiary (FS) execute a cost sharing agreement (CSA) to develop digital
goods and services, an internet platform, related software, and business
processes for earning revenues worldwide from the sale, exchange, rental,
lease, or similar transactions related to such digital goods and services.
Under the CSA, each of USP and FS owns a share of the internet platform
and holds the economic rights for exploitation of the developed IP within
its respective geographic territory (for USP, North America, and for FS,
the rest of the world). FS (including its disregarded entity subsidiaries)
conducts marketing, customer service, logistics, and related activities
within its territory. Under a service agreement, FS contracts with USP for
USP to maintain and manage the internet platform that USP and FS jointly
own. It is determined that the facts and circumstances of USP and FS
cause FS to be engaged in trade or business within the United States under
the provisions of section 1.864-2. FS’s income or loss from sources within
the United States is treated as effectively connected for 2005 with the
conduct of a business in the United States.
•

Office or Other Fixed Place of Business Within the United States
Amend Reg §1.864-7(c) by adding the following sentence at the end of this
paragraph.
However, where the officers or other personnel of the domestic parent
corporation are not only responsible for policy decisions affecting the
related foreign sales corporation, but also conduct activities that represent
the business of that foreign sales corporation (for example, officers or
other personnel are involved in negotiations with major customers,
approve the terms of specific sales contracts, manage or control the
purchasing and sourcing of inventory property from vendors or from
contract manufacturers, etc.) or manage its commercial risks, then that
foreign sales corporation will be considered to have an office or other
fixed place of business in the United States.

10

Amend Reg §1.864-7(g) by adding the following new Example (7) at the end of
this paragraph.
Example (7). S, a foreign corporation, is engaged in the business of
manufacturing a microphone and selling it to customers within its
territory, which is all countries outside North America. S is a wholly
owned subsidiary of P, a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing the same microphone and selling it to customers in North
America. The physical manufacture of the microphone is performed by an
unrelated contract manufacturer under separate contract manufacturing
agreements that each of P and S have executed with the contract
manufacturer. P and S have executed a cost sharing agreement (CSA) for
the development of the microphone and the production processes to
produce it.
Employees of P conduct the bulk of the development work under the CSA.
They also conduct virtually all functions described in section 1.9543(a)(4)(iv)(b), which represent a substantial contribution to the
manufacture of the microphones. The performance of these functions is
integral and necessary for both P and S to source their respective
microphones from the contract manufacturer.
S does not have a fixed facility in the United States, and none of its
employees are stationed in the United States. Officers and employees of P
are generally responsible for the policies followed by S and are directors
of S. S has a chief executive officer in Country A who, from its office
therein, handles the day-to-day conduct of S's business. However, the
chief executive officer does not have the knowledge or capability to
perform the functions described in section 1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)(b) or to direct
another person to do so. If P did not perform these functions, S would be
incapable of either manufacturing, or having manufactured, the
microphones for which it holds IP rights under the CSA.
Based upon the facts presented, S is considered to have an office or other
fixed place of business in the United States for purposes of this section.
•

Income, Gain, or Loss Attributable to an Office or Other Fixed Place of
Business in the United States
Reg. §1.864-6, which in part concerns sales of goods or merchandise through a
U.S. office of a foreign taxpayer, focus closely on the sales contract and not on
the many critical activities, often performed within the United States by related
persons, that strongly support not only consummated sales but critical purchase
and production functions. We recommend amending the first sentence of Reg
§1.864-6(b)(2)(iii) to read as follows:
Income, gain, or loss from sales of goods or merchandise specified in
paragraph (b)(3) of section 1.864-5, if the office or other fixed place of
business is involved in purchasing such goods or merchandise, conducts
production activities with respect to such goods or merchandise (within
11

the meaning of section 1.954-3(a)(4)(i), including activities described in
paragraph (4)(iv)(b)), or actively participates in soliciting the order,
negotiating the contract of sale, or performing other significant services
necessary for the consummation of the sale which are not the subject of a
separate agreement between the seller and the buyer.
The effect of this amendment is best illustrated by an example. Say that a zero- or
low-taxed foreign group member sells products through an internet platform that
is maintained and managed by a U.S. group member. The U.S. group member
could also conduct certain product purchasing functions for the foreign group
member. Assume that the foreign group member does not have any foreign office
that is a material factor in the realization of income (see Reg §1.864-6(b)(3)(i)).
Assume also that the foreign group member through its own employees (including
the employees of any disregarded entity subsidiary) does not perform any product
purchasing functions.
Under the current regulation, the foreign group member takes the position that
neither the operation of the internet platform nor the purchasing activities
conducted by the U.S. group member cause the sales income to be attributable to
an office or fixed place of business within the U.S. This means that even with no
foreign office that is a material factor in the realization of income and with no
purchasing activities performed by the foreign group member, the gross income
from sales will not be ECI.
With the suggested amendment of the first sentence of Reg §1.864-6(b)(2)(iii)
(and the other suggested regulatory changes included in this submission), it will
be clear that the sales income will be attributable to an office or fixed place of
business within the U.S. Once this “attributable to” condition is met, the sales
income will be U.S. source income under §865(e)(2) and ECI under §864(c)(3).
•

Production and Sale of Inventory Property (§863(b)(2))
With the amendment by the TCJA of §863(b), there will undoubtedly be
significant amendments to certain of the regulations under §863. We suggest
below several items that could be included as a part of these amendments.
Reg §1.863-3(c)(1)(i)(A)
Amend the first three sentences of this subclause to read:
For purposes of this section, production activity means an activity that
creates, fabricates, manufactures, extracts, processes, cures, or ages
inventory including activities that constitute a substantial contribution
(within the meaning of section 1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)) to the manufacture,
production, or construction of personal property. See section 1.864-1.
Subject to the provisions in section 1.1502-13 or paragraph (g)(2)(ii) of
this section, the production activities that are taken into account for
purposes of sections 1.863-1, 1.863-2, and this section are those conducted
directly by the taxpayer and those conducted by the taxpayer’s agents and
related persons within the meaning of section 1.954-1(f).
12

Reg §1.863-3(c)(1)(i)(B)
Amend the first sentence of this subclause to read:
Subject to the provisions of section 1.1502-13 and paragraph (g)(2)(ii) of
this section, production assets include tangible and intangible assets
owned directly by the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s agents, and related persons
(within the meaning of section 1.954-1(f)) that are directly used to produce
inventory described in paragraph (a) of this section.
Reg §1.863-3(c)(1)(i)(C)
The location of intangible production assets could be based on where the
personnel are who perform relevant “substantial contribution” activities as
described in Reg §1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)(b).
Consideration of Alternative Manner of Apportionment
Given the need to modernize Reg §1.863-3 to reflect new business models such as
those using contract manufacturers and activities constituting a “substantial
contribution to the manufacture of personal property” as described in Reg §1.9543(a)(4)(iv)(b), consideration should be given to an alternative method of
apportionment when basing apportionment on the location of production assets is
inappropriate. For example, perhaps allocations based on the location of personnel
(whether employed by the taxpayer, its agents, or its related parties) involved in
the Reg §1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)(b) production activities could be more appropriate in
such situations. Or, the personnel costs of such production-involved persons could
be used.
Reg §1.863-3(g)(3)
To make clear the application of the §863 rules to a foreign partner in a
partnership for purposes of determining effectively connected income, add the
following Example 3 to Reg §1.863-3(g)(3):
Example 3. Distribution in kind to foreign partner.
Assume the same facts as in Example 1 except that the partnership, instead
of selling the widgets, distributes the widgets to A and B. B sells the
widgets outside the United States through a sales office in its country of
incorporation. In determining the effectively connected income earned by
B on its gross profit from sales outside the United States, B is treated as
conducting the activities of the partnership related to production of the
distributed widgets. Accordingly, in applying this section, B is treated as
owning its proportionate share of the partnership's production assets based
upon its distributive share of partnership income. The source of gross
income on the sale of the widgets is determined under section 863 and
these regulations. B makes sales of inventory property produced in whole
by the taxpayer within the United States and sold without the United
States. Accordingly, income from B’s sale of widgets shall be allocated
and apportioned between sources within and without the United States
solely on the basis of the production activities. As all production activities
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occur within, and all production assets are within the United States, all
gross profits on B’s sale of widgets are sourced within the United States.
(If B simply purchased widgets from a third party located in the US for
sale outside the US, wouldn’t B avoid having US sourced income?)
To make clear the application of the §863 rules to a foreign partner in a
partnership that uses a contract manufacturer for the physical production and
makes a substantial contribution to production within the meaning of Reg §1.9543(a)(4)(iv)(b), add the following Example 4 to Reg §1.863-3(g)(3):
Example 4. Partnership makes substantial contribution to the production
of inventory.
Assume the same facts as in Example 3 except that the partnership, instead
of manufacturing widgets in the partnership's plant located in the United
States, engages an unrelated contract manufacturer in another county for
the physical manufacture of the widgets. The partnership through its
facilities and personnel within the United States conducts the activities
specified in Reg §1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)(b), thereby making a substantial
contribution to the manufacture, production, or construction of the
widgets. The partnership is accordingly considered to have produced the
widgets sold. In determining the effectively connected income earned by
B on its gross profit from sales outside the United States, B is treated as
conducting the activities of the partnership related to production of the
distributed widgets. The consequences described for Example 3 apply as
well for this Example 4.
Anti-Abuse Rules in Connection with Certain Disregarded Entities
Our article attached to this submission as Appendix G, “Effects of New Sourcing
Rule: ECI and Profit Shifting”, in section III discusses foreign producer sales into
the U.S. The article explains the double non-taxation result that some foreign
producers will have from selling foreign manufactured products into the U.S.
through a disregarded entity (DRE) subsidiary (e.g. a limited liability company)
that is treated as a sales branch of the foreign producer by the U.S. but as a
separate taxpayer by the country of the producer.
Through such a mechanism, while profit attributable to the manufacturing
functions conducted in the producer’s home country will be subject to tax in that
country, the profits attributable to sales activities conducted within the DRE
subsidiary will typically go untaxed by both the producer’s home country and the
U.S.
Under territorial tax systems used in most producers’ home countries, there will
typically be no home country taxation of the profits within the DRE subsidiary.
Non-taxability by the U.S. of those same DRE subsidiary earnings is the result of
the U.S. entity classification rules and the TCJA amendment to §863(b). Under
that amendment, gross income from sales of property produced by a taxpayer in
one country and sold in another is sourced solely in the location (or locations)
where produced. As such, all gross income will be foreign source and will escape
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effectively connected income treatment despite the foreign producer being
engaged in trade or business within the U.S.
Setting up a hybrid structure like this to create double non-taxation will likely be
relatively easy for many foreign producers selling into the U.S. We strongly
recommend that an anti-abuse rule that would override such structures be
included in new regulations that reflect the TCJA amendment to §863(b).
•

Required Technical Correction of §864(c)(4)(D)(i)
Code §864(c)(4)(D)(i)) provides an exception to ECI treatment when a foreign
corporation pays dividends, interest, or royalties that are foreign source income in
the hands of the foreign taxpayer recipient and the foreign “…taxpayer owns
(within the meaning of section 958(a)), or is considered as owning (by applying
the ownership rules of section 958(b)), more than 50 percent of the total combined
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote...”
Given the potentially expansive effect on this provision by the deletion of
§958(b)(4), it would appear that there should be a technical correction proposed to
make this sub-clause read:
(i) consists of dividends, interest, or royalties paid by a foreign corporation
in which the taxpayer owns (within the meaning of section 958(a)), or is
considered as owning (by applying the ownership rules of section 958(b)
as in effect before its amendment by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act), more
than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock
entitled to vote, or
In order to reverse the effect of the deletion of §958(b)(4) by the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act within the regulations, Reg §1.864-5(d)(1) should be amended by adding
the phrase “as in effect before its amendment by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L.
115-97)”, so that after amendment this subparagraph reads:
Dividends, interest, or royalties paid by a foreign corporation in which the
nonresident alien individual or the foreign corporation described in
paragraph (a) of this section owns, within the meaning of section 958(a),
or is considered as owning, by applying the ownership rules of section
958(b) as in effect before its amendment by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
(P.L. 115-97), at the time such items are paid more than 50 percent of the
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote.

•

Update of Reg §§1.864-5(d)(2)(iv) and (v)
Reg §1.864-5(d)(2) provides an exclusion from ECI treatment for certain subpart
F income of a CFC. One reference in this clause is to §954(c)(3) instead of
§954(c)(2)(A). Another is to §954(c)(4) instead of §954(c)(3). These differences
are due to subsequent reordering of the paragraphs within §954(c). Reg §§1.8645(d)(2)(iv) and (v) should be amended to reflect these changes so that they would
read:
(iv) Any income derived in the active conduct of a trade or business which
is excluded under section 954(c)(2)(A), or
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(v) Any income received from related persons which is excluded under
section 954(c)(3).
•

Update of Reg §§1.864-5(b) and 1.864-6(b)
Reg §1.864-5(b), which deals with the treatment of certain foreign source income,
refers in subparagraph (1)(ii) to gain or loss on the sale of intangible personal
property. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514) inserted §865, which deals
with sales of intangibles and causes §§865(d)(1)(A) and (e)(2) to govern the
treatment of such transactions. P.L. 100-647, §1012(d)(10)(A), also amended
§864(c)(4)(B) to eliminate coverage of such sales of intangibles by paragraph (4).
Since §865(e)(2) can make such sales U.S. source and therefore covered by
§864(c)(3), clause (ii) of Reg §1.864-5(b)(1) no longer has any relevance and
should be deleted. In addition, Reg §§1.864-5(b)(3)(iii) and 1.864-6(b)(2)(i)
should be amended to remove any reference to gains or losses on the sale or
exchange of intangible personal property.

If the Treasury and IRS do issue modernized regulations, they should consider issuing a
notice as soon as possible to alert taxpayers to any planned regulatory changes. This
could be done in a manner similar to the notices issued for inversions (i.e. Notice 201452 and 2015-79) and anticipated regulations to implement certain TCJA changes. Such a
notice could not only announce the planned amendments to the sourcing and ECI rules,
but it could also alert taxpayers that ECI is subject to higher effective tax rates due to the
branch profits tax (see §884) and the loss of deductions and credits and the open statute
of limitations where no tax return has been filed (see §§882(c)(2) and 6501(c)(3)). Such
notice(s) would strongly encourage MNCs to refrain from implementing or continuing
profit shifting structures.
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APPENDIX B
Amendment of Reg §301.7701-1(a)(2) and/or Issuance of Revenue Ruling on
Partnership Status for Certain Profit-Shifting Structures
Problem: Many MNC profit-shifting arrangements involve U.S. and foreign group
members that conduct joint business activities using personnel, assets, and activities of
two or more of the group members. Despite this reality of how many MNCs are
operating, they take the position that such group members are totally independent of each
other. Two examples will help demonstrate this.
First, consider an MNC that conducts a seamless worldwide business earning advertising
revenues through a software platform, developed and expanded primarily by U.S. group
members, that displays advertisements to the users of free services (e.g. email, search,
etc.). While individual MNC group members record income from advertisers based on
the advertiser’s geographic location, U.S. group members conduct within the U.S. in one
integrated operation for all applicable group members the day-to-day management and
functions that allow the platform to operate and generate advertising revenues worldwide.
These day-to-day management activities and functions are the guts of business operations
and the actual activities that earn the profits.
Although zero- and low-taxed foreign group members, which license group IP or own it
through cost sharing agreements, record their revenues and related expenses as if they
were separate independent businesses, from a management and operational standpoint,
they are not independently run businesses. Rather, they are part of one enterprise
centrally run and conducted from within the U.S. Typically, such foreign group members
do not have either the personnel or capabilities to conduct their own independent business
or to even direct independent contractors acting on their behalf.
(Note that to keep the example simple, the above paragraph assumes a platform that is
generating advertising revenues. The example could also cover platforms such as those
that serve the gig economy and those that sell third-party produced products on either a
buy-and-resell or commission basis.)
Second, using an unrelated Asian contract manufacturer, an MNC produces products for
sale worldwide through a centrally managed supply chain. U.S. group members manage
and conduct the bulk of the product development. Importantly, U.S. group members also
manage and conduct the day-to-day production process itself, including functions such
as:
(i)

Oversight and direction of production activities;

(ii)

Material selection, vendor selection, control of raw materials, work-inprocess, or finished goods;

(iii)

Management of manufacturing costs or capacities;

(iv)

Control of manufacturing-related logistics; and

(v)

Quality control.
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The MNC makes product sales through a number of sales channels. One channel is large
volume sales made to major multinational customers and distributors around the world.
Personnel within the U.S. not only set group-wide sales policy, but they may also be
involved in maintaining relationships and negotiating sales terms with these major
customers and distributors. Another channel involves sales made through a software
platform used worldwide, for which U.S. group members conduct within the U.S. for all
group members the day-to-day management and functions that allow the platform to
operate and make sales. Despite this critical involvement of U.S. group members, sales to
all foreign customers and distributors are recorded within zero- and low-taxed foreign
group members. Such group members may provide local warehousing and other
customer, logistical, and technical support, but they do not have the personnel or
capability to independently conduct their own business. They are unable to direct the U.S.
group members that are nominally acting as independent contractors, but that are in
reality conducting crucial sales and production management, decision-making, and
operational functions for the benefit of all group members making product sales.
(Note that this second example has been described as one that involves tangible inventory
property. It could also involve the sale of intangible inventory property such as groupproduced software.)
Although operationally the above two MNC group examples each conduct a globally
seamless and centrally managed joint business, there is no overt partnership, joint
venture, or similar contract governing the manner in which the group members conduct
their joint business. Rather, each group member contracts separately with third parties
(e.g. customers, raw material and component vendors, contract manufacturers, etc.) to
give the legal appearance of separate and independently operating companies. Reflecting
the reality that many functions benefiting zero- or low-tax foreign group members are
being conducted by U.S. group members, intercompany service and similar agreements
are executed that treat the U.S. group members as independent contractors and not as
agents, partners, or joint venturers.
Solution: As covered in detail within the undersigned’s article on unexpected partnership
status, the above-described MNC profit shifting structures often create separate entities
for federal tax purposes under Reg §301.7701-1(a)(2). Under the Reg §301.7701-3(b)
default rules, these separate entities are characterized as partnerships.
It will be useful to contrast today’s business models such as those described above with
multinational businesses of decades ago that had a much different format than what has
become so common today. Under this decades-old format, a U.S. parent company set
group policies and provided oversight over its subsidiaries. However, these subsidiaries
had a full complement of their own corporate officers (e.g. CEO, operations director,
sales director, finance director, etc.) working from the subsidiary’s facilities. The
subsidiaries were truly standalone operations. Real on-the-ground management was an
absolute necessity given the pre-internet communications and other technologies of the
time (e.g. the telephone, telex, and fax machines). Enterprise software was in its infancy
and even email did not emerge as a business communications device until the 1990s.
Given these independently run subsidiaries, there were not sufficient “joint business
activities” that would ever cause any separate entity for tax purposes or a partnership.
The issue simply didn’t arise.
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Today, however, there is no longer any need for each subsidiary to have a full
complement of its own corporate officers. The technology advances of the past several
decades have allowed both a true centralized management and an isolation of specific and
often narrow business functions that contribute to one worldwide business. The
subsidiaries are each contributing to the group’s worldwide business; they are no longer
conducting their own independent businesses. The rise of supply chains where various
functions occurring in different locations all contribute to one worldwide business is just
one example. Another is the centralized management and operation of a worldwide
internet-based business. Today’s reality within many, if not most, MNCs is actual joint
business activities and integrated management and operations.
Over the past several decades, the now commonly used centralized management of
worldwide business has become the norm. It is easier, more cost effective, and
commercially viable to manage and control a world-wide business using a management
structure that relies on integrated technology and that directs personnel, assets, and
activities located around the world toward a common goal. The reality of this centralized
management of group members and each member’s sometimes narrow contribution to
the group’s worldwide business falls squarely within the applicable rules to create a
separate entity and a partnership for tax purposes.
Once the relationship between the U.S. and foreign group members is determined to be a
partnership, there are several consequences.
•

The U.S. and foreign group members are partners with the activities conducted
and the assets used in that business considered to be those of the partnership and
no longer the activities and assets of the respective partners. With the partnership
carrying on a business through one or more U.S. offices, the foreign group
member partners are similarly conducting a trade or business in the U.S.
(§875(1)), which is the threshold test for applying the effectively connected
income rules (§864(c)). Application of the ECI rules will be clear and
unambiguous.

•

Both partnership filing and §1446 withholding will apply.

Given both the important deterrence effect that partnership status will have on aggressive
profit shifting structures and the important tool it represents for the government in its
efforts to attack such structures, the authors recommend one, or, preferably, two actions.
First, the Treasury and the IRS should make appropriate regulation amendments. Second,
they should issue one or more revenue rulings that find separate entity and partnership
status for relevant group members in certain profit shifting structures.
Amendment of Reg §301.7701-1(a)(2)
We suggest that Reg §301.7701-1(a)(2) be amended to read as follows:
A separate entity for federal tax purposes shall include a joint venture or other
arrangement, whether or not evidenced by a contract or other written agreement,
through or by means of which the participants carry on any business, financial
operation, or venture. For example, a separate entity exists for federal tax
purposes if co-owners of an apartment building lease space and in addition
provide services to the occupants either directly or through an agent. On the other
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hand, mere co-ownership of property that is maintained, kept in repair, and rented
or leased does not constitute a separate entity for federal tax purposes. A joint
undertaking merely to share expenses does not create a separate entity for federal
tax purposes. For example, if two or more persons jointly construct a ditch merely
to drain surface water from their properties, they have not created a separate entity
for federal tax purposes. Similarly, if an individual owner, or tenants in common,
of farm property lease it to a farmer for a cash rental or a share of the crops, they
do not necessarily create a separate entity for federal tax purposes. Participants,
however, may create a separate entity for federal tax purposes if they actively
carry on a trade, business, financial operation, venture, or any portion thereof and
divide in any manner the profits or the products or other results thereof. Such a
trade, business, financial operation, or venture may include, for example, (i) the
joint production of inventory property, whether tangible or intangible, where the
participants take in-kind or dispose of their shares of any property produced,
extracted, or used, or (ii) the joint conduct of an internet platform-based business
(e.g. giving advertisers access to platform users or providing cloud or other
services including, for example, providing software and applications to users and
acting as a sales agent or intermediary between users and third-party providers).
The above recommended language does two things. First, it adds examples that take into
account modern business models using digital technologies. Second, it moves and
expands the phrase “divide the profits therefrom”.
While the addition of modern business model examples is self-explanatory, the
movement and expansion of the “profits” phrase deserves some explanation.
The first sentence of present Reg §301.7701-1(a)(2) reads:
A joint venture or other contractual arrangement may create a separate entity for
federal tax purposes if the participants carry on a trade, business, financial
operation, or venture and divide the profits therefrom. [Emphasis added.]
This sentence implies that for a separate entity to exist for federal tax purposes, the
arrangement amongst the participants must have profits (or presumably losses) that are
shared in some manner between them. Importantly, this implication is neither consistent
with other Code and regulatory provisions nor with the historical regulations on which
the current Reg §301.7701-1(a)(2) is based.
Regarding this inconsistency with other Code and regulatory provisions, first note
§§761(a) and 7701(a)(2) that provide, with only minor language differences:
For purposes of this subtitle, the term ‘‘partnership’’ includes a syndicate, group,
pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization through or by means of
which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not,
within the meaning of this title, a corporation or a trust or estate.
Focusing solely on this statutory language, joint production alone carried out by MNC
group members reasonably falls within ‘‘any business, financial operation, or venture.’’
This is made 100% certain by §761(a)(2), which effectively states that an organization
that is availed of “for the joint production, extraction, or use of property, but not for the
purpose of selling services or property produced or extracted” may elect to be excluded
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from the application of all or part of subchapter K. If such an organization were not a
partnership covered by subchapter K in the first place, it would not be necessary to have a
specific provision allowing it to elect out of subchapter K. The point here, of course, is
that an arrangement in which two or more participants solely produce inventory property
with each participant taking its share in-kind will have no revenues from joint sales or
services. As such, it will have no profit to share amongst the participants. Hence, without
question, a separate entity for federal tax purposes can exist without the sharing of
profits.
Note that even if this §761(a)(2) were not already a 100% certainty for joint production,
for any MNC group members that also conduct joint sales, licensing, and service
activities, these joint activities absolutely fall within these statutory provisions.
We stated above that there is also an inconsistency between the current regulation (Reg
§301.7701-1(a)(2)) and the historical regulation on which the current regulation is based.
This inconsistency directly involves the phrase “divide the profits therefrom”.
Specifically, to repeat, the first sentence of Reg §301.7701-1(a)(2) is:
A joint venture or other contractual arrangement may create a separate entity for
federal tax purposes if the participants carry on a trade, business, financial
operation, or venture and divide the profits therefrom. [Emphasis added.]
This placement of the “divide the profits” phrase makes it appear that the existence of
profits and their being divided amongst the participants is a condition for there to be a
separate entity for federal tax purposes. By contrast, the pre-1997 regulation (Reg
§301.7701- 3(a)) from which this language was taken reads, in part:
(a) In general. The term ‘‘partnership’’ is broader in scope than the common law
meaning of partnership and may include groups not commonly called
partnerships. Thus, the term ‘‘partnership’’ includes a syndicate, group, pool,
joint venture, or other unincorporated organization through or by means of which
any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not a
corporation or a trust or estate. . . . Mere co-ownership of property which is
maintained, kept in repair, and rented or leased does not constitute a partnership. .
. . Tenants in common, however, may be partners if they actively carry on a trade,
business, financial operation, or venture and divide the profits thereof. For
example, a partnership exists if co-owners of an apartment building lease space
and in addition provide services to the occupants either directly or through an
agent. [Emphasis added.]
This “divide the profits” phrase was previously only a means of distinguishing within the
regulation one example of a situation involving co-ownership of property and did not
modify the basic definition of a partnership, which was: “a syndicate, group, pool, joint
venture, or other unincorporated organization through or by means of which any
business, financial operation, or venture is carried on.” This use in one example was, of
course, fully consistent with the statutory definitions in both §§761(a) and 7701(a)(2),
neither of which included any “divide the profits” requirement and neither of which was
changed when the current regulation was promulgated in 1997.
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By moving this “divide the profit” phrase to the first sentence in Reg §301.7701-2(a), it
became in appearance a principal part of the definition of a separate entity for federal tax
purposes, and thus narrowed the meaning of that term.
Was there any intention when the new 1997 the check-the-box regulations were issued to
actually change the meaning, or at least the emphasis, of the definition of separate entity
for federal tax purposes and narrow it through the addition of this “divide the profit”
phrase?
We believe there was no such intention for any change that would narrow the meaning.
First, of course, the statutory definition of “partnership” of many decades had not
changed in either of §§761(a) or 7701(a)(2). Thus, there was no authority for any
narrowing of the definition of “partnership” or the term “separate entity for federal tax
purposes”, which is critical for defining the classification of entities under the new checkthe-box regulations. Second, with the overall intention of the 1997 check-the-box
regulations being simplification, the Treasury and IRS were likely just cleaning up the
language of the reconfigured regulations without intending any change of meaning.
Interest in Partnership for Determining Distributive Share (§704(b))
As indicated earlier, the statutory definition of partnership, and by extension the
definition of a separate entity for federal tax purposes, is very broad and includes
organizations established under applicable local law and those established through
contracts and the joint actions of the parties. The MNC group member relationships
briefly described in the above examples are established through the operating joint
activities of the parties and by other relevant factors, including verbal understandings,
internal group policies, management lines of authority, and intercompany contracts —
including any licensing and cost sharing agreements as well as any intercompany service
agreements under which U.S. group members provide services to foreign group members.
All of these will be factors in defining each participant’s interest in the separate entity for
federal tax purposes, and thus each participant’s interest in the partnership for
determining its distributive share under §704(b).
Consideration should be given to adding guidance and examples to Reg §1.704-1.
First, as a simplified approach that would be practical and easy to apply, the partnership
profits (i.e., generally the combined profits of the joint business conducted by the group
member partners) could be apportioned each year based on some appropriate factor(s)
that each group member partner brings into the partnership. These factors could include,
for example, the year’s average net assets, average personnel, average compensation,
gross income from sales, etc. An additional factor that could often be relevant would be
cumulative R&D expenses to reflect the contribution of intangibles.7 Where production
occurs through use of a contract manufacturer and group personnel are performing the
functions described in Reg §1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)(b), the personnel performing these
manufacturing functions may be quite important and indicative of what each group
Note that where a partnership is found, any CSA that the partners may have executed
would no longer be recognized since all relevant activities would be treated as occurring
within the partnership, which is a single taxpayer. A CSA requires that there be two or
more taxpayers.
7

22

member partner contributes to the partnership with net assets having little relevance. For
many profit shifting structures, the zero- or low-taxed foreign group members will likely
bring little or nothing into the partnership in the way of many of these factors.
A possible second approach would be to determine partner interest-in-the-partnership
percentages as of the creation of the partnership. Those percentages would then be
applied to the partnership profits for each subsequent year. Such percentages could be
based on the original terms of the intercompany agreements executed among the group
members when the partnership was created (i.e. likely at the same time that the group
initiated its profit shifting structure). The terms of those various agreements (cost sharing
agreement, any licensing agreements, intercompany service agreements, etc.) should
reflect any IRS transfer pricing adjustments or advance pricing agreement that may have
been obtained by the group.
A third approach would be to apportion the partnership profits by determining for each
year each partner’s interest-in-the-partnership, and thus its distributive share, based on
the various written agreements between them (e.g. the cost sharing agreement, service
agreements, etc.) and each partner’s separate agreements with third parties (e.g.
customers, contract manufacturers, suppliers, etc.).
Issuance of Revenue Rulings
We recommend that one or more revenue rulings be issued that prescribe when a joint
business conducted by an MNC’s group members shall create a partnership for tax
purposes with those group members as the partners and their separate activities, which
are limited to those activities that are part of the joint business, being treated as activities
of the partnership. Such guidance for certain profit shifting structures should be a simple
approach to demonstrating the government’s resolve to fight artificial profit shifting
structures.
One or more revenue rulings could also explore the issue of what group members’
activities might be factually included within the joint business, and therefore included as
activities of the partnership and not the separate activities of any partner. In addition to
activities such as joint purchasing, production, and sales activities, research and
development benefiting all group member partners would be included as well. As noted
above in footnote 7, when so included, a ruling could provide that any cost sharing
agreement signed by the group member partners would be no longer recognized for tax
purposes.
Article 3 in footnote 3 provides detailed information from which a ruling may be drafted.
The writers of this letter would be pleased to provide further guidance if it would be
helpful.
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APPENDIX C
Designate Certain MNC Profit-Shifting Structures as Listed Transactions
Many MNC profit-shifting structures exhibit three factors that suggest the existence of a
U.S. trade or business, a partnership, and ECI. The three factors are:
(a) Critical value-drivers performed predominantly by U.S. group members;
(b) Extensive U.S.-located control and decision-making that far exceed what
would be found in typical unrelated-party situations; and
(c) A lack of capable foreign member management personnel and no CEO or
similar position within the foreign group member who in substance runs that
entity’s worldwide business from an office outside the U.S.
We suggest that profit-shifting structures with these characteristics be designated as a
“listed transaction” under Reg §1.6011-4(b)(2). If so designated, all parties will be on
notice concerning the various penalty and disclosure requirements that apply to taxpayers
that fail to report relevant income and pay tax. This should encourage some MNCs and
their advisors to change or unwind existing profit-shifting structures as well as
discouraging the creation of new structures. It should also discourage professional firms
from pushing risky structures on existing and potential clients due to the disclosure and
penalties applicable to any material advisor.
If for any reason it is determined that it is not possible to designate these structures as
“listed transactions”, they could be designated as “transactions of interest” under Reg
§1.6011-4(b)(6).
Whether or not it is decided to designate certain profit-shifting structures as listed
transactions or transactions of interest, and to the extent that doing so would not require
Congressional action, consideration should be given to providing administrative relief to
unwind profit-shifting structures so as to encourage compliance and self-reporting of
prior years’ tax obligations on amended or late filings through abatement of penalties
and/or other amounts that might otherwise be due.
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APPENDIX D
Profit-Shifting Structures Implemented Following Inversions and Acquisitions by
Foreign Acquirers
There have been and continue to be both inversion transactions and acquisitions of U.S.based MNCs by foreign persons (including foreign acquisition vehicles owned by U.S.
private equity funds). In all of these cases, following the inversion or acquisition, there
are considerable tax-motivations to transfer U.S.-owned intangible assets to foreign group
members and to establish profit-shifting structures that route profits to group members
that are not CFCs.
Treasury and the IRS should consider issuing one or more notices to make clear that
following any such inversion or acquisition the valuation of any transferred assets and the
potential for ECI and earnings stripping will be priorities for examination. This could also
be made a part of the LB&I Campaign program.
The following paragraphs include two examples. The first clearly illustrates post
acquisition transfers of U.S. intangibles and related issues. The second, while not a tax
case, illustrates how the acquisition of IP may be an important motivation for a foreign
acquirer. In such cases, IRS examinations should be looking not only for undervaluation
of IP transfers, but also for unrecorded transfers where acquirer group members merely
start using the IP in their other products. This may have occurred in this Segway
example.
Example 1 – Valeant Pharmaceuticals International
The first and perhaps best example is Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, a Canadian
public company listed in the U.S. that is the result of a 2010 inversion. Interestingly,
because Valeant was invited on July 30, 2015, to testify before the Senate Homeland
Security and Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (“PSI”), there is
significant internal company information on tax avoidance involved in Valeant’s
acquisitions of U.S. groups (including, for example, Salix Pharmaceuticals (2015) and
Bausch and Lomb (2013)).8
The PSI Majority Staff Report,9 on pages 12 through 31 provides significant detail on
how Valeant transferred intangibles owned by the acquired companies out of the U.S.
shortly after each acquisition and set up profit-shifting arrangements. Not only is there
the issue of valuation for transferred intangibles, which were transferred to an Irish
subsidiary, but with the apparent lack of any change in the conduct of the acquired
companies’ businesses, it is likely that the Irish company has significant taxable ECI
following the transfer of these intangible assets.

All PSI hearing documents are available at
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/impact-of-the-ustax-code-on-the-market-for-corporate-control-and-jobs
9 Available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=2C48E3A3-AFBE-43CB8F05-0996EAAFCDF7
8
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Example 2 – Segway
Turning to another U.S. taxpayer, on September 9, 2014, Segway Inc. filed a trade
complaint10 against a number of companies, most of which are Chinese. The basis for the
trade complaint was that the respondents were importing products that infringed various
Segway patents. Later in April 2015, it was announced that one of the Chinese
respondents, Ninebot Inc., would acquire Segway.11 An interview with a co-founder of
the acquirer stated:
The primary benefit of buying Segway is the patents. … Ninebot is still young, as
is Xiaomi [a major Chinese company partially funding Ninebot], so we can’t
successfully apply for many patents. Segway has the core patents for the selfbalancing vehicle industry, so this acquisition will help us with our patents a lot.12
It seems likely that in many acquisitions like this, there may be not only undervalued
transfers of intangibles to foreign acquirers, but there may be many undocumented
transfers of designs, processes, and patent rights to foreign acquirers. IRS audit activity
must identify such transferred intangibles and discourage such transfers through giving
notice to applicable taxpayers of this priority.
The TechCrunch piece cited in footnote 8 commented regarding Xiaomi:
This marks the latest in a series of hardware and Internet of Things investments
by Xiaomi, which has also given funding to companies like Misfit, Pebbles
Interfaces, and iHealth Labs. Alliances with these startups can potentially help
Xiaomi build its e-commerce unit, which, along with Internet services and
hardware like its smartphones, form the core parts of its business.

Available at http://www.itcblog.com/images/segwaycomplaintLR.pdf
Shu, “Beijing-based Ninebot Acquires Segway, Raises $80M From Xiaomi And
Sequoia”, TechCrunch (April 15, 2015), available at
http://techcrunch.com/2015/04/15/ninebot-segways-into-the-future/.
12 Horwitz, “The founder of China’s Ninebot says he bought Segway for the patents”,
TechinAsia (April 17, 2015), available at https://www.techinasia.com/founder-chinasninebot-bought-segway-patents.
10
11
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APPENDIX E
Addition of Examples to the Manufacturing Branch Rule
Article 6 listed in footnote 3 notes how the manufacturing branch rule may apply to cause
some gross income not caught by the ECI rules to be subpart F income. This treatment is
not sufficiently clear in existing regulations and we suggest the following examples be
added to the regulations as set out below.
In brief, assume that the facts underlying an MNC’s profit shifting structure cause there
to be an unanticipated partnership for U.S. tax purposes with U.S. group members and
zero- or low-taxed foreign group members as partners. An explanation of why this may
be likely is covered in Appendix B of this submission.
Although the MNC group uses one or more unrelated Asian contract manufacturers for
the physical production of inventory property, the joint production activities of the group
members conducted through the partnership meet the requirements of Reg §1.9543(a)(4)(iv)(a) so that the inventory property sold by the partnership is considered
manufactured, produced, or constructed by the partnership, and in turn by the CFC
partners (Reg §1.954-3(a)(6)). As a result of this, the manufacturing branch rule of Reg
§1.954-3(b)(1)(ii) applies. Note the last sentence of subparagraph (a) of Reg §1.9543(b)(1)(ii), which reads:
… The provisions of this paragraph (b)(1)(ii) will apply only if the controlled
foreign corporation (including any branches or similar establishments of such
controlled foreign corporation) manufactures, produces, or constructs such
personal property within the meaning of paragraph (a)(4)(i) of this section, or
carries on growing or extracting activities with respect to such personal property.
Example 1 – All Manufacturing Performed in U.S.
Assume first that all of the partnership’s production activities within the meaning of Reg
§1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)(b) occur at offices and other facilities within the U.S. so that each CFC
partner “carries on [through the partnership] manufacturing, producing, constructing,
growing, or extracting activities by or through a branch or similar establishment located
outside the country under the laws of which such corporation is created or organized”.
Also assume that some portion of the partnership’s sales are made for use, consumption,
or disposition outside the U.S.
Before the TCJA and its amendment of §863(b), gross income from the production of
inventory property within the U.S. and its sale outside the U.S. was sourced through one
of several regulatory approaches that sourced a portion of the gross profit based on the
taxpayer’s production activities and the remainder based on the taxpayer’s sales
activities. After this TCJA amendment of §863(b), all (100%) of the gross profit is
sourced at the location(s) of production.
Prior to the TCJA §863(b) amendment, the manufacturing branch rule is relevant for this
Example 1, which involves production activities solely within the U.S. This is because
the pre-TCJA partnership will have some foreign source income due to sales made
outside the U.S. Because this foreign source gross income is not ECI and therefore could
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not be directly taxable to a CFC partner, this foreign source income must be subjected to
subpart F analysis. After the TCJA, with 100% of the gross profit based at the location of
production, all gross profit under the facts of this Example 1 will be ECI, thereby causing
subpart F and the manufacturing branch rule to no longer be relevant. (However, see
Example 2 below with different facts where the manufacturing branch rule is relevant
post-TCJA.)
With the partnership’s manufacturing branch being located in the U.S., the manufacturing
branch rule (Reg §1.954-3(b)(1)(ii)(b)) is applied to pre-TCJA years by comparing the
effective tax rate on the relevant foreign source sales income with 30%. This 30% is the
lower of 90% of, or 5 percentage points less than, the 35% U.S. tax rate that existed prior
to the TCJA. If the actual taxes imposed are less than 30%, the manufacturing branch rule
applies to relevant foreign sales income that would otherwise be caught by the Code
§954(d)(1) definition of foreign base company sales income (FBCSI).
Note that not all foreign source income will be FBCSI. For example, say that the
partnership (or a low-taxed foreign member partner) has a sales office in Singapore. In
that case, inventory property sold for use, consumption, or disposition within Singapore
would not be caught by the Code §954(d)(1) FBCSI definition. However, sales into
nearby Malaysia where there is no sales office would be caught.
Example 2 – Manufacturing Performed Both Within and Without the U.S.
Assume now that 50% of the partnership’s production activities for certain personal
property occurs at offices and other facilities within the U.S. and 50% for that personal
property occurs at offices in China adjacent to the facilities of an unrelated contract
manufacturer. All activities performed by the partnership within the U.S. and in China are
those described in Reg §1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)(b) and the partnership (and each CFC partner)
is considered to have manufactured these items of personal property under Reg §1.9543(a)(4)(iv)(a). The countries of incorporation of the CFC partners are zero- or low-taxed
countries other than the U.S. or China. Through these U.S. and Chinese facilities, the
partnership (and each CFC partner) “carries on manufacturing, producing, constructing,
growing, or extracting activities by or through a branch or similar establishment located
outside the country under the laws of which such corporation is created or organized”.
The partnership makes sales both within and outside the U.S.
With production activities being conducted both within and outside the U.S., under
§863(b), whether prior to or following the above-mentioned TCJA §863(b) amendment,
some portion of the gross income earned will be foreign source and, therefore, not ECI.
With this foreign source income not being directly taxable ECI to any CFC partner, this
foreign source income must be subjected to subpart F analysis.
The facts of this Example 2 make Reg §1.954-3(b)(1)(ii)(c)(3) applicable, which provides
in part:
This paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(c)(3) applies to determine the location of manufacture,
production, or construction of personal property for purposes of applying
paragraph (b)(1)(i)(b) or (b)(1)(ii)(b) of this section where more than one branch
or similar establishment of a controlled foreign corporation, or one or more
branches or similar establishments of a controlled foreign corporation and the
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remainder of the controlled foreign corporation, each engage in manufacturing,
producing, or constructing activities with respect to the same item of personal
property which is then sold by the controlled foreign corporation. …
Without going into unnecessary detail, Reg §1.954-3(b)(1)(ii)(c)(3) includes a number of
examples that cover various possible factual situations involving a CFC’s production
activities in multiple locations and the use of unrelated contract manufacturers.
Understandably, the examples consider situations involving one CFC with multiple
operating locations and with its own personnel in each such location. None of the
examples specifically consider a situation where multiple CFCs are conducting joint
business operations in a manner that has created a partnership for tax purposes.
Simple Addition to Reg §1.954-3
Many MNC profit shifting structures implemented over the past two decades involve
multiple group members (including both U.S. group members and CFCs) that conduct
portions of a centrally managed and conducted worldwide business that is seamless to
vendors, customers, and other third parties. As discussed in Appendix B, despite the lack
of any partnership or joint venture agreement, the joint business activities conducted by
these group members will often create a separate entity for federal tax purposes and a
partnership under the Reg §301.7701-1 to -3 entity classification rules. Given such
unanticipated partnerships, it is important to add clarity to Reg §1.954-3 such that
taxpayers have increased guidance and the IRS has more specificity in taxing aggressive
profit shifting structures that involve such jointly conducted businesses.
We believe that such clarity may be added to Reg §1.954-3 by adding the following
example to Reg §1.954-3(a)(6):
Example. USP, a U.S. corporation, wholly owns CFC, a controlled foreign
corporation organized under the laws of Country A. It has been determined that
USP and CFC conduct their centrally managed worldwide business in a manner
that creates a separate entity for federal tax purposes under section 301.77011(a)(2) and a partnership under the section 301.7701-3(b) default rules
(Partnership Y). As a result of this partnership classification, all assets, personnel,
and activities involved in the joint production and sales are considered the assets,
personnel, and activities of Partnership Y and not the assets, personnel, or
activities of either partner.
Through offices, facilities, and employees within the United States and Country
B, Partnership Y performs activities within both countries that constitute the
manufacture of Product P, within the meaning of paragraph (a)(4) of this section
(including paragraph (a)(4)(iv)), if performed directly by CFC. Partnership Y,
through its sales office in Country D, sells Product P to unrelated customers in
Country E, a country in which Partnership Y maintains no sales branch.
CFC’s distributive share of Partnership Y’s sales income must be analyzed to
determine whether it is foreign base company sales income taking into account all
of section 1.954-3 including both the manufacturing exception of paragraph (a)(4)
and the branch rules of paragraph (b).
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APPENDIX F
Regulatory and Ruling Guidance Concerning Tax Treaties
There has been significant profit shifting out of the U.S. and erosion of the U.S. tax base
by both MNCs based in the U.S. and MNCs based abroad. Those based abroad include
inverted MNCs, private equity acquisitions through foreign acquisition vehicles, and
legitimate foreign-based groups. In some cases, such profit shifting has taken advantage
of U.S. tax treaty provisions to reduce or eliminate withholding taxes or to apply treaty
rules such as permanent establishment definitions in place of the lower-threshold
standard of “engaged in trade or business within the United States”.
Brief Background on Common Situations Involving Taxpayer Abuse of Treaties
•

Structures that Shift Business and Intangible Profits
With U.S.-based MNCs and some MNCs based abroad, especially inverted MNCs
and private-equity structures, the foreign group member that is the “taxpayer” for
U.S. tax purposes is a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) that is operating
through one or more disregarded entity (DRE) subsidiaries. Some of those DRE
subsidiaries are established in countries with which the U.S. maintains tax
treaties. While such a DRE subsidiary is a bona-fide legal entity, fully respected
as a separate taxable entity by its country of formation, it is treated solely for U.S.
tax purposes as not existing and as a branch or division of its CFC owner, i.e., not
an “entity”. Accordingly, the U.S. views all DRE subsidiary personnel, assets, and
activities as being employed, owned, and conducted by the CFC.
As an example, assume that a U.S.-based MNC has established a CFC in a tax
haven such as Bermuda. As that CFC has few or no employees of its own, it
conducts business through subsidiaries in other countries for which check-the-box
elections have been made to treat them as DRE subsidiaries. As a result of this
structure, from a U.S. tax perspective, the only “taxpayer” is the Bermuda CFC.
And that CFC operates through branches/divisions within the various countries
where the DRE subsidiaries employ personnel, own assets, and conduct their
respective operations. Those branches and divisions are not considered to be
“entities” for U.S. tax purposes.
The authors of this submission have written a number of articles (see footnote 3)
describing some structures through which MNCs have shifted business and profits
from intangible assets out of the U.S. and into zero- and low-taxed group
members, one of which may be a CFC while others are DRE subsidiaries of that
CFC. An important focus of these articles has been the possible application of
effectively connected income taxation to some portion of these shifted profits
(§864(c)). Typically, these profit shifting structures not only shift profits out of
the U.S. They also shift profits out of the foreign countries in which they operate
through DRE subsidiaries. As a result, these structures normally bear very low
levels of foreign taxation.
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ECI taxation requires that the foreign taxpayer (i.e., the CFC in this case) be
engaged in a trade or business within the U.S. (§864(b)). Where a tax treaty
properly applies, this “trade or business within the U.S.” threshold is replaced by
the permanent establishment definition included in the treaty. Further, where there
is a permanent establishment and some amount of ECI is present, it is taxable at
the normal corporate rate (pre-TCJA 35%, post-TCJA 21%). In addition, the
branch profits tax (§884) applies at rate of 30% to the calculated dividend
equivalent amount. If a tax treaty were to apply, then that 30% branch profits tax
may be reduced or eliminated if the treaty specifies a lower rate or exemption.
•

Structures Involving Interest, Royalties, and Dividends
DRE Subsidiaries. In addition to business income, DRE subsidiaries may license
IP for use in the U.S. or loan money to U.S. persons, thereby earning U.S. source
royalties and/or interest. A DRE subsidiary might also invest in the shares of nonrelated U.S. companies, thereby earning U.S. source dividends. Where a DRE
subsidiary is established in a country with which the U.S. maintains a tax treaty, it
might maintain that it should receive a reduction or elimination of the 30%
withholding tax that applies under domestic law to these types of payments.
Other Foreign Entities. Foreign-based MNCs have aggressively eroded the U.S.
tax base through interest and royalties charged to their U.S. operating subsidiaries.
Concern about this has resulted in the TCJA adding new §59A, the base erosion
minimum tax. This sort of base erosion by foreign-based MNCs normally does
not involve either CFCs or DRE subsidiaries. It does, though, often involve
routing interest and royalties though structures that arguably provide tax treaty
benefits that reduce or eliminate the 30% U.S. withholding tax while avoiding any
significant tax in the country of the treaty partner.

The U.S. enters into treaties to prevent double taxation; not to provide the opportunity for
double non-taxation. Despite this, we see situations where taxpayers go through
complicated structuring that arguably allows them to claim inappropriate treaty benefits.
Most commonly, this means that they claim a treaty benefit from the U.S. while the
relevant income is not taxed in the other treaty country on a normal resident basis. Thus,
the sorts of profit-shifting structures and channeling of income from U.S. sources
described above are normally only set up in treaty countries that offer special
arrangements under which only a mere fraction (if any) of the normal resident tax is
imposed. Well-known examples include Ireland and Luxembourg. Both have been
documented as agreeing to special rulings and artificial practices that allow zero or little
taxation far below the domestic effective corporate rates that apply to resident taxpayers.
These special arrangements and low effective tax rates were not what U.S. treaty
negotiators agreed to nor what the Senate thought it was ratifying.
The example within the first bullet point above assumes that the CFC is established in
Bermuda, which maintains no tax treaty with the U.S. The CFC could also have been
established in a country with which the U.S. maintains a tax treaty such as the U.K.,
Ireland, Switzerland, etc. In such cases, all (or virtually all) of the operating income is
earned not within the CFC itself, but rather within the CFC’s DRE subsidiaries. As such,
that operating income would not be reported in the tax returns that the CFC submits to its
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own tax authorities in, say, the U.K. Further, due to the territorial tax systems and other
exemptions and special rules employed by many countries, DRE subsidiary earnings
actually distributed to the CFC typically go untaxed in the CFC’s country of
establishment.
Say that this CFC established in the U.K. claims that the activities of its DRE subsidiaries
do not cause a permanent establishment in the U.S. under the U.S.-U.K. tax treaty. Or,
say that the CFC has ECI and files a U.S. tax return to report profits earned within its
DRE subsidiaries, but claims that the U.S.-U.K. tax treaty reduces the 30% branch profits
tax to 5%. With the relevant income for which the CFC is claiming benefits under the
U.S.-U.K. tax treaty not being reported within any U.K. tax filings, it is inappropriate for
treaty benefits to be granted.
It could also occur that a DRE subsidiary claims tax treaty benefits based on the U.S.
treaty with the country of establishment of the DRE subsidiary. This could occur, for
example, where the DRE subsidiary claims that it has no permanent establishment within
the U.S. or that the 30% branch profits tax should be reduced or exempted. It could also
occur where the DRE subsidiary claims treaty reductions in the 30% U.S. withholding tax
on dividends, interest, and royalties. Often, such claims involve taxpayer abuse that seeks
benefits not anticipated by either U.S. treaty negotiators or the Senate.
The second bullet point also notes the inappropriate use of tax treaties by foreign-based
MNCs to erode the U.S. tax base. CFCs and DRE subsidiaries are often not involved in
such claims for treaty benefits.
Discussion
Fiscally Transparent Entities. Our belief is that such above-described abusive situations
involving a CFC taxpayer that conducts business operations or records transactions
(including investments, loans, licenses, etc.) through DRE subsidiaries should never
receive any treaty benefits, either at the CFC level or at the level of any DRE subsidiary.
(The only exception might be where the DRE subsidiary is incorporated within the same
country as the CFC for solely non-tax reasons and tax on a normal resident basis is being
paid to that country by both the CFC and the DRE subsidiary.) Almost without exception,
schemes involving CFCs and DRE subsidiaries have been carefully crafted to avoid or
significantly reduce both foreign and U.S. taxation by carefully working to fall within
mismatches between the tax laws of the U.S. and one or more other countries to arbitrage
their tax systems.
Both Fiscally Transparent and Non-Fiscally Transparent Entities. Sometimes, carefully
crafted structures involve a special arrangement between a foreign entity (whether a DRE
subsidiary or any non-fiscally transparent foreign entity) and the foreign tax authorities
that allows these companies to pay tax at zero or discounted rates not allowable absent
such agreement. In these cases, since the home county is not taxing the foreign entity on a
true resident basis, no reduction in or elimination of U.S withholding taxes or other tax
treaty benefits (e.g. the application of business profits provisions and reduction in or
elimination of the §884 branch profits tax) should be permitted.
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The remainder of this Appendix F provides specific recommendations on regulation
amendments or guidance that could be provided in a revenue ruling that would disallow
these inappropriate treaty benefits.
Fiscally Transparent Entities—Treaty Benefits Other than Reduction or
Elimination of Withholding Taxes
With respect to non-withholding tax treaty benefits claimed where CFC and DRE
subsidiary structures are involved, the terms of tax treaties and current law allow the IRS
to disallow these benefits. The IRS may directly enforce these rules against such abusive
arrangements.
For the CFC, the fact that its tax filings made to its home country will exclude all income,
deductions, credits, etc. recorded within its DRE subsidiaries means that it cannot be a
resident for purposes of the tax treaty under the last sentence of Article 4, paragraph 1.
This sentence in the February 17, 2017, version of the U.S. Model Income Tax
Convention reads:
… This term does not include any person whose tax is determined in that
Contracting State on a fixed-fee, “forfait” or similar basis, or who is liable to tax
in respect only of income from sources in that Contracting State or of profits
attributable to a permanent establishment in that Contracting State. [Emphasis
added.]
For the DRE subsidiaries, as indicated earlier, a DRE subsidiary is not recognized as an
“entity” for U.S. tax purposes. As such, the IRS may simply refuse to grant any relevant
tax treaty benefits under the treaty between the U.S. and the country of establishment of
the DRE subsidiary on the basis that the DRE subsidiary cannot be a “person” for
purposes of that treaty under Article 3, and therefore not a treaty “resident” under Article
4.
Needed: Regulatory and/or ruling guidance concerning the non-applicability
of tax treaty benefits in the above circumstances.
Fiscally Transparent Entities—Treaty Benefits for Withholding Taxes
With respect to reduction in or elimination of withholding taxes, Reg §1.894-1(d)
provides relevant rules.13
A critical first rule relevant to these abusive arrangements is that the regulation provides
for DRE subsidiaries at paragraph (d)(3)(i) an expansive definition of “entity”. As such,
this definition overrides the lack of any “entity” (as explained in the section immediately
above) that otherwise occurs under the domestic U.S. rules.
Needed: A tax abuse rule that will override this paragraph (d)(3)(i)
definition.
A critical second rule is the regulation’s concept of “derived by a resident” found in
paragraph (d)(1). T.D. 8889 (65 F.R. 40993-41000, 2000) consciously included this
13

Note that Reg §1.894-1(d) by its terms only applies to certain withholding taxes. These
rules have no applicability to the non-withholding tax treaty benefits discussed
immediately above.
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concept as the mechanism to determine qualification for withholding tax treaty benefits.
In brief, T.D. 8889 included the following explanation:
Commentators suggested that the term subject to tax in the proposed and
temporary regulations was ambiguous and could be misinterpreted.
Commentators suggested that the term subject to tax could be interpreted as
requiring that an actual tax be paid rather than requiring an exercise of taxing
jurisdiction by the applicable treaty jurisdiction, whether or not there is an actual
tax paid. Commentators suggested that such an interpretation would lead to
anomalous results, for example, in cases when the applicable treaty jurisdiction
provides an exemption from income for U.S. source dividends under its tax laws.
The IRS and Treasury agree that the term subject to tax could cause unintentional
confusion and that a more direct and simpler way of ensuring that an item of
income is subject to the taxing jurisdiction of the residence country is to
determine if the item of income is derived by a resident of a treaty jurisdiction.
The concept of derived by a resident is a more useful surrogate for the concept of
subject to the taxing jurisdiction of the residence state, the necessary prerequisite
for the grant of treaty benefits on an item of income.
Because of this expansive “derived by a resident” rule that is totally divorced from any
actual or potential tax liability or inclusion in taxable income, special rulings,
administrative practices, and other artificial means have expanded to meet the needs of
MNCs intent on creating complex structures that shift profits and/or erode the U.S. tax
base, making full use of the U.S. treaty network in the process. The light shed on this
from the LuxLeaks disclosures14 and other sources has been extensive.
Needed: A tax abuse rule that will override this “derived by a resident” test
and replace it with a “subject to tax” test.
In considering the above, the Treasury and IRS should keep in mind that the MNCs that
create these CFC and DRE subsidiary structures have voluntarily-made check-the-box
elections. The applicable taxpayer (i.e., the CFC) was not coerced into making these
elections for its subsidiaries. Rather, these elections are made only after careful groupwide study of how to maximize profit-shifting and base erosion benefits. This being the
case, it is more than reasonable that such taxpayers must live with the consequences of
their actions. The above recommendations are appropriate and in no way excessive.
Abuse Not Involving Fiscally Transparent Entities
Many foreign MNCs abuse the U.S. treaty network on interest and royalty flows. One of
the clearest examples is described in the Majority Staff Report titled “Impact of the U.S.
Tax Code on the Market for Corporate Control and Jobs” issued on July 30, 2015, by the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Committee of Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs) under the Chairmanship of Rob Portman. The example involves
Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc., a Canadian-based pharmaceutical MNC that
resulted from a 2010 inversion.
14

Available at: https://www.icij.org/project/luxembourg-leaks/explore-documentsluxembourg-leaks-database
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The following is from pages 25-30 of this 2015 Majority Staff Report:
In connection with the Bausch & Lomb acquisition, Valeant pushed down $2.4
billion of the acquisition debt from its foreign affiliates to a Delaware subsidiary
(VPI-Delaware), thereby creating a stream of deductible interest payments that
have significantly reduced Bausch & Lomb’s U.S. tax base. Specifically, ValeantCanada issued an aggregate $7.3 billion in debt financing from third-party banks.
Valeant-Canada then made an interest-free loan of $3.1 billion to a Luxembourg
subsidiary, Biovail International S.a.r.l., which in turn made an interest-bearing
loan (at 6%) of $2.4 billion to VPI-Delaware.
The result of this intercompany lending is evident in the rise in Valeant- U.S.’s
tax-deductible, outbound related-party interest payments. In the two years
preceding the Bausch & Lomb acquisition, Valeant’s U.S. group made an average
of $219,000 per quarter in related-party interest payments. In the first full year
following the acquisition, those payments swelled to $59.9 million per quarter—a
273-fold increase. To date, Valeant’s U.S. group has made $320.2 million in
interest payments on the Bausch & Lomb acquisition debt to Biovail International
S.a.r.l. and projects another $375 million in interest payments through the first
quarter of 2017; those payments will continue through the life of the loan. The
interest payments are fully deductible in the U.S. and subject to no U.S. federal
withholding taxes. Only a portion of the interest income received by Valeant in
Luxembourg is taxable—at single-digit tax rates.
[Emphasis added and footnotes omitted.]
As if this insult to the U.S. taxation system were not enough, the following is from page
30 of the 2015 Majority Staff Report:
Valeant structured the Salix acquisition debt in a manner that will significantly
reduce Valeant’s U.S. tax base. Valeant-Canada raised $15.2 billion in debt
financing from third parties to support the Salix acquisition. Valeant then made an
interest-free loan of $16.5 billion to VFL (Luxembourg). VFL, in turn, made six
intercompany loans totaling $16.5 billion to VPI Delaware at an average interest
rate of approximately 6.2%. Valeant projects that, from the first quarter of 2015
through the first quarter of 2017, it will make $1.67 billion in interest payments
on the Salix debt to VFL; those payments are scheduled to continue until the
maturity date of each loan (ranging from 2021 to 2025). To date, Valeant’s
interest payments on the Salix acquisition debt have been fully deductible in the
U.S. and subject to no U.S. federal withholding taxes. Only a portion of the
interest income received by Valeant in Luxembourg is taxable—at single-digit tax
rates. [Emphasis added and footnotes omitted.]
This sort of artificial arrangement (very low effective tax rate in Luxembourg due to
deemed interest deductions on an interest-free loan), and most likely a special ruling from
the Luxembourg tax authorities, is abusive. The group’s international planning likely
results in a double deduction of interest and little or no effective taxation ever of the
interest income in either Luxembourg or in Valeant’s home country of Canada.
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Needed: Regulatory and/or ruling guidance to help taxpayers and the IRS
identify abusive situations where tax treaty coverage should no longer be
appropriate given that the relevant income is not being taxed in the treaty
country of residence in the same manner as a normal resident would be
taxed.15
As an indication of the basis for such broad guidance, the following is from T.D. 8999
(67 F.R. 40157-40162, 2002). The initial sentence refers to abuses involving domestic
reverse hybrids.
… The overall effect of these transactions, if respected, would be (1) a deduction
under U.S. law for the “outbound” payment of an item of income, (2) the
reduction or elimination of U.S. withholding tax on that item of income under an
applicable treaty, and (3) the imposition of little or no tax by the treaty partner on
the item of income. This result is inconsistent with the expectation of the United
States and its treaty partners that treaties should be used to reduce or eliminate
double taxation of income. The legislative history of section 894(c) supports this
analysis. Congress specifically expressed its concern about the use of income tax
treaties to manipulate the inconsistencies between U.S. and foreign tax laws to
obtain similar benefits. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No 220, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 573
(1997); Joint Committee on Taxation, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., General
Explanation of Tax Legislation Enacted in 1997 (JCS-23-97), at 249 (December
17, 1997). The approach adopted by these regulations also is consistent with the
U.S. view that contracting states to an income tax treaty may adopt provisions in
their domestic laws to prevent inappropriate use of the treaty. …
As further encouragement of the critical need for additional regulatory and/or ruling
guidance in this general area, it may be noted that Reg §1.894-1(d) was promulgated soon
after the issuance of the new check-the-box entity classification rules and without
anticipating how MNCs would aggressively utilize them to shift profits outside the U.S.
and erode the U.S. tax base.

Interestingly, while guidance is needed to cover the entire U.S. treaty network, it
should be noted that the U.S.-Luxembourg treaty states in Article 24 (Limitation on
Benefits):
15

10. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Article, Luxembourg holding
companies, within the meaning of the Act (loi) of July 31, 1929 and the
Decree (arrete grand-ducal) of December 17, 1938, or any subsequent
revision thereof, or such other companies that enjoy a similar special fiscal
treatment by virtue of the laws of Luxembourg, are not residents. [Emphasis
added.]
Considering the low level of taxation within Luxembourg due to the interest free
loan with a deemed interest deduction, this provides a strong treaty-based position
to deny coverage of this tax treaty for abusive transactions. Consideration should be
given to expanding rulings and other Treasury and IRS materials to provide
guidance that takes actual tax treaty provisions such as this into account.
36

T.D. 8889 and T.D. 8999 expanded Reg §1.894-1 in 2000 and 2002, focusing principally
on structures that would involve income flows to “real” foreign persons. Further, they
were expressly limited to treaty benefits applicable to withholding taxes and domestic
reverse hybrids. T.D. 8889 commented:
These regulations apply with respect to all U.S. income tax treaties regardless of
whether such treaties contain partnership provisions, unless the competent
authorities agree otherwise. As with the proposed and temporary regulations, the
final regulations address only the treatment of U.S. source income that is not
effectively connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business. The IRS and
Treasury may issue additional regulations addressing the availability of other tax
treaty benefits, such as the application of business profits provisions, with respect
to the income of fiscally transparent entities, particularly where a conflict in entity
classification exists. [Emphasis added.]
After these regulations were issued, abusive profit shifting and base erosion by U.S.
MNCs involving foreign hybrid entities grew quickly, if not exponentially, especially
after the 2004 Jobs Act repatriation incentive. Despite this quick growth, detailed study
and knowledge only started to become public in 2010 when the Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation issued its report titled “Present Law and Background Related to
Possible Income Shifting and Transfer Pricing” (JCX-37-10), dated July 20, 2010, for a
Ways and Means Committee public hearing. This public hearing and the JCT’s report,
along with other hearings and investigative reporting in subsequent years (Google,
Microsoft, Apple, Caterpillar, etc.), laid clear the aggressive and artificial nature of many
of the structures that our MNCs eagerly adopted.
In short, it’s time for regulatory and ruling guidance that eliminates inappropriate treaty
benefits both within the framework of Code §894(c) and broader.
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David L. Koontz is a retired CPA who spent 25
years working in offices in the United States and
Asia as a tax partner in a major accounting firm.
Later he was involved with international
transactions, including raising capital from
multiple sources and using it in public and
private companies worldwide. Jeffery M. Kadet
was in private practice for over 32 years, working
in international taxation for several major
international accounting firms. He now teaches
international tax courses in the LLM program at
the University of Washington School of Law in
Seattle.
In this article, Koontz and Kadet discuss the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act’s new sourcing rule for
sales of manufactured inventory property, which
states that gross income from the sale or
exchange of property produced by the taxpayer
will be sourced at the place of manufacture. That
is a departure from the old rule, which assigned
gross income partially to the place of sale (the old
title passage rule) and partially to the place of
manufacture. They explain that in addition to
closing a long-standing foreign tax credit
loophole, this change gives foreign-based entities
selling manufactured products in the United
States a clear roadmap for avoiding U.S. tax on
those sales. Also, it profoundly affects the many
multinational profit-shifting structures that
involve groups with manufacturing
management, decision-making, and related
functions within the United States, but which
often use contract manufacturers outside the
United States. When effectively connected
income taxation applies, more gross income will
be sourced within the United States and be
taxable ECI. The authors argue that Treasury and
the IRS should modernize reg. section 1.863-3
and related rules to reflect not only this TCJA
change, but also the business models using
contract manufacturers that did not exist when
the current regulations were issued.
Copyright 2018 David L. Koontz and
Jeffery M. Kadet.
All rights reserved.

For the first time in eons, Congress has seen fit
to change a basic rule for the sourcing of income.
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The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L. 115-97) minced
few words in its addition of a single sentence to
section 863(b) that applies to sales or exchanges of
inventory property (1) produced in whole or in
part by the taxpayer in one country, and (2) sold or
exchanged in another country. The United States
can either be the country where the inventory
property is produced or the country where it is
sold.
The new sentence reads:
Gains, profits, and income from the sale or
exchange of inventory property described
in paragraph (2) shall be allocated and
apportioned between sources within and
without the United States solely on the basis
of the production activities with respect to the
property. [Emphasis added.]
With this change, income from the sale of
inventory produced by a taxpayer will no longer
be sourced at the location where any sales
activities take place. Rather, the location, or
locations, of production activities will be the sole
determining factor. This change is effective for tax
years beginning after December 31, 2017.
I. Why Was the Rule Changed?
Under the U.S. tax system, sourcing of income
within or outside the United States has been, and
will remain, important for two principal reasons.
First, income source is the basis for the vitally
important foreign tax credit limitation formula,
which specifies the maximum foreign income
taxes that may be used by a U.S. taxpayer to offset
U.S. income tax. Second, a non-U.S. taxpayer will
be subject to tax in the United States only on
income that is either U.S. source or is effectively
connected with the conduct of a trade or business
within the United States. The determination of
effectively connected income is very much
dependent on sourcing rules.
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Despite those two principal reasons for the
importance of sourcing rules, the committee
reports explaining this change in law do not focus
on how the change could affect either the FTC or
the taxation of non-U.S. taxpayers. Rather, the
House committee report merely says:

reduce current U.S. tax payable. That result was
allowed even if the taxpayer had no overseas
branch or other foreign activities that contributed
to the sale. By eliminating sales activities as a
factor and sourcing income at the place of
2
production, that loophole has been closed.

The Committee acknowledges that
current administrative guidance, which
sources sales income, in part, based on the
place of destination rather than the place
of production, may be appropriate in the
context of our current tax system.
However, the Committee believes this
approach is not appropriate under a
participation exemption system with
lower tax rates. Rather than providing
targeted relief to particular kinds of
income, the Committee is instead
reducing tax rates for all taxpayers, while
also modernizing the U.S. system for
taxing cross-border income. Therefore, the
Committee believes changing present law
in this area will more accurately measure
foreign-source taxable income as part of
providing a flatter, fairer, and simpler tax
1
system.

II. Effect on Profit-Shifting Structures

The committee is saying that the sourcing
change is consistent with two of the TCJA’s
fundamental changes: (1) the significant
reduction of corporate rates, and (2) the
participation exemption. But the committee
leaves it to the reader to speculate why that might
be so.
While the above reflects Congress’s
explanation of good tax policy, we suspect that the
amendment most likely reflects a desire to
eliminate a long-standing loophole for artificially
increasing a U.S. taxpayer’s ability to use foreign
taxes to offset U.S. taxes. In brief, under the old
rule and the long-standing regulations
interpreting it, it was often possible for a U.S.
taxpayer that is manufacturing products within
the United States and selling them overseas to
treat half of the gross profit as foreign source,
thereby artificially increasing the available FTC
limitation and using otherwise excess FTCs to

A. ECI Taxation and Profit-Shifting Structures
The authors have written several articles
focused on the application of ECI taxation to
specific profit-shifting structures involving
worldwide businesses that are centrally managed
and conducted from the United States.3 Those
structures typically exhibit three economic and
operational factors:
1. value drivers in the United States;
2. control and decision-making in United
States; and
3. lack of a foreign group member CEO
and management outside the United
States that are capable of operating an
independent stand-alone business.
When applicable, ECI taxation would impose
4
U.S. corporation tax at normal corporate rates on
some portion of the shifted profits that
multinational groups have recorded within their
foreign group members established in zero- or
low-taxed foreign jurisdictions (low-taxed foreign
members). Note that this imposition of U.S.
corporate tax on ECI is a direct tax on the lowtaxed foreign member. This contrasts with the
indirect taxation that arises under the subpart F
controlled foreign corporation rules or through

2

For further discussion of this rule change, see Jasper L. Cummings,
Jr., “Selective Tax Act Analysis: Subpart F and Foreign Tax Credits,” Tax
Notes, Jan. 29, 2018, p. 653.
3

Jeffery M. Kadet, “Attacking Profit Shifting: The Approach
Everyone Forgets,” Tax Notes, July 13, 2015, p. 193; Thomas J. Kelley,
David L. Koontz, and Kadet, “Profit Shifting: Effectively Connected
Income and Financial Statement Risks,” 221 J. Acct. 48 (Feb. 2016); Kadet
and Koontz, “Profit-Shifting Structures and Unexpected Partnership
Status,” Tax Notes, Apr. 18, 2016, p. 335; Kadet and Koontz, “ProfitShifting Structures: Making Ethical Judgments Objectively, Part 1,” Tax
Notes, June 27, 2016, p. 1831; and Kadet and Koontz, “Profit-Shifting
Structures: Making Ethical Judgments Objectively, Part 2,” Tax Notes,
July 4, 2016, p. 85.
4

1

H.R. Rep. No. 115-409, at 384.
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The rates are currently 21 percent (up to 35 percent before the
TCJA), plus the 30 percent section 884 branch profits tax when not
reduced or eliminated under an applicable tax treaty.
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transfer pricing adjustments when the taxpayer is
a U.S. person.
A common feature of many profit-shifting
structures is that a low-taxed foreign member
sources its inventory directly from one or more
contract manufacturers, whether related or
unrelated, and sells it to customers around the
world. As explained below, the low-taxed foreign
member, despite the lack of its own
manufacturing facilities, is economically the
manufacturer, with this manufacturer status
normally reflected contractually through the
following mechanisms:
i. Holding intellectual property rights. The
low-taxed foreign member will be a
licensee or a participant in, respectively, a
license or cost-sharing agreement that
defines the IP rights held.
ii. Agreements with contract manufacturers.
These agreements are typically more in
the nature of service agreements. The
party holding the intangibles (that is, the
IP that allows production and
trademarking of a specific product) directs
the other party, which has the necessary
plant, equipment, and personnel, to use
those intangibles to produce the specified
products. In the absence of such an
agreement, the contract manufacturer
would not be allowed to produce the
5
product.
iii. Intercompany agreements. Under
intercompany agreements, other group
members (typically located primarily
within the United States) perform
production activities for the low-taxed
foreign member. Usually structured as
service agreements, the service provider
group member contractually purports to
act as an independent contractor and not
as a partner, agent, or in a joint venture
with the low-taxed foreign member.
Despite this contractual approach, the
service provider often performs crucial

5

As an example of a contract manufacturing arrangement, see
Facebook’s 2017 Form 10-K at 24. The Form 10-K sets out clearly the
group’s use of third parties to manufacture its Oculus products, as well
as the various production and other commercial risks the group faces.
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business functions and makes business
decisions for the low-taxed foreign
member. These are functions and
decision-making that the low-taxed
foreign member typically has neither the
capacity nor the personnel to either
conduct itself or competently direct
service providers to perform.
In short, under these arrangements, the lowtaxed foreign member is not simply purchasing a
product for resale. Rather, directly or indirectly, it
conducts manufacturing and assumes most of the
same production and commercial risks that any
manufacturer assumes, and is, in fact, the
manufacturer. Because these low-taxed foreign
members are both producing and selling, section
863(b) is relevant when two jurisdictions are
involved and either the production or selling
activities occur within the United States.
Profit-shifting structures often involve a lowtaxed foreign member (including its disregarded
6
entity subsidiaries ) that is taxed either nowhere
or at low effective tax rates in the countries where
it conducts operations. These structures also
conveniently sidestep the CFC rules by avoiding
purchases from and sales to related group
7
members. Thus, before the effective date of the
TCJA, and ignoring any potential ECI taxation, no
U.S. tax would have been paid currently on the
8
low-taxed foreign member’s profits.

6

Reg. section 301.7701-2(c)(2). Unless otherwise noted, any reference
in this article to the low-taxed foreign member includes the assets,
personnel, and activities of any disregarded entity subsidiaries that are
treated as divisions or branches for U.S. tax purposes.
7

More than just U.S.-based multinational groups are involved in
profit-shifting structures. When, for example, an inverted multinational
based in Ireland uses a low-taxed foreign member that records sales of
inventory property as part of a profit-shifting structure, that low-taxed
foreign member will often be owned directly or indirectly by the Irish
parent. In that case, no income will be created under either sections 951
or 951A, meaning that the subpart F and GILTI rules will be irrelevant.
For an example of planning using non-CFCs by an inverted group, see
the discussion of Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc.’s
acquisitions and subsequent internal operations concerning Medicis
Pharmaceutical Corp., Bausch & Lomb Holding Inc., and Salix
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. from pages 19ff of the majority staff report
prepared for hearings before the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
“Impact of the U.S. Tax Code on the Market for Corporate Control and
Jobs” (July 30, 2015).
8

Of course, if a dividend were paid to a U.S. shareholder before the
effective date of the TCJA, U.S. tax would be paid.
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After the TCJA’s effective date (and again
ignoring any potential ECI taxation), the global
9
intangible low-taxed income provisions could
result in current U.S. tax at an effective rate of
roughly half the domestic 21 percent corporate tax
rate. That lower effective tax rate will cause many,
if not most, multinationals to continue existing
profit-shifting structures and will likely
encourage many new ones. Even the
Congressional Budget Office in its April 2018
Budget and Economic Outlook concluded that the
TCJA will have only a minor effect on the
approximate $300 billion of profits it estimates are
shifted each year out of the U.S. tax base. The CBO
estimates that the TCJA will reduce this $300
billion by only $65 billion, with a third of that
reduction (say $20 billion to $25 billion) relating to
IP transfers into zero- and low-taxed countries.
These IP transfers are integral to the profit shifting
that is a focus of this article. (Note that about half
of this $65 billion estimated reduction arises from
TCJA provisions focused on profit shifting that
10
involves debt and its related interest charges. )
Multinationals that have created profitshifting structures include:
1. U.S. multinationals;
2. former U.S. multinationals that have
inverted;
3. former U.S. multinationals acquired by
private equity and other investment funds
through foreign acquisition vehicles; and
4. former U.S. multinationals acquired by
foreign multinationals that leave U.S.
management intact.

The low-taxed foreign members of
multinationals in the first category will almost
always be CFCs and subject to the CFC rules as
well as the new GILTI rules. However, for the
other three categories, the low-taxed foreign
members will normally be owned by foreign
group members so that there is no coverage by the
CFC and GILTI rules.11 Because of this, for the
other three categories, the new GILTI rules will
not at all discourage these profit-shifting
structures in the future. Further, these structures
will seldom, if ever, involve any outbound
related-party payments from U.S. group
members, meaning that the new base erosion
12
minimum tax will have no effect.
In summary, aside from potential ECI
taxation, most multinationals will have no reason
to either discontinue existing profit-shifting
structures or refrain from initiating new ones.
B. Basis for ECI Taxation
As noted above, a low-taxed foreign member
within a profit-shifting structure may hold IP
rights allowing it to manufacture products or to
rely on others, such as contract manufacturers, to
do so. Often, the low-taxed foreign member has
neither the physical assets (for example, plants
and equipment) nor knowledgeable personnel
that would make it capable of either
manufacturing the products on its own or
directing a contract manufacturer to produce
them. So without either physical assets or
personnel, how does such a low-taxed foreign
member operate? How does it acquire the
products that it will sell to its distributors and
customers around the world?

9

Detailed discussion of GILTI is beyond the scope of this article. See
sections 951A and 250.
10

See the CBO’s April 2018 Budget and Economic Outlook, at 124-127.
This report makes clear the CBO’s doubt that there will be any significant
reduction of profit shifting. From page 125:
CBO estimates that the reduction in the U.S. corporate tax rate,
combined with the new [GILTI] rules governing the treatment of income
from high-return investments (much of which is derived from IP), will
reduce corporations’ incentives to shift profits by transferring IP outside
the United States. However, that effect is expected to be modest. IP is
especially easy to relocate, so MNCs are typically able to locate it in
whichever affiliates face the lowest tax rate on the income that it
generates. Because tax havens outside the United States will continue to have
relatively low tax rates, CBO projects that most IP currently located will remain
there. For newly created or future IP, the changes resulting from the tax act and
the fixed costs of transferring IP to foreign affiliates will probably deter some
small amount of profit shifting. [Emphasis added.]
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For the other three categories, there will be situations where a lowtaxed foreign member is partially owned by one or more U.S. group
members. Even where the U.S. ownership is less than 50 percent, the
TCJA’s repeal of section 958(b)(4) may have the effect of causing those
group members to be CFCs. Despite such a CFC classification, the
directly foreign-owned portion should remain protected from any
subpart F or GILTI taxation.
12

See section 59A and Kadet and Koontz, “Internet Platform
Companies and Base Erosion — Issue and Solution,” Tax Notes, Dec. 4,
2017, p. 1435.
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Over the past few decades, technological and
other digital developments13 have allowed many
multinational groups with worldwide businesses
centrally managed from the United States to
create supply chains that include important
production and sales functions conducted in
multiple countries. In some cases, although
physical manufacturing may be conducted in
plants and facilities around the world (with those
plants and facilities often being owned and
operated by unrelated contract manufacturers),
almost by necessity, many if not all significant
production activities (short of the physical
production) are carried out by U.S.-based
personnel. In those situations, U.S.-based
personnel are responsible for and actually
conduct production activities for the group’s
worldwide operations — that is, they plan,
manage, and carry out production activities for all
group members that hold IP exploitation rights
for various geographic regions. For example,
personnel based within the United States make
business decisions and conduct production
activities that directly allow (1) one or more U.S.
group members to manufacture or have
manufactured the products that they sell to U.S.
customers, and (2) one or more low-taxed foreign
members to manufacture or have manufactured
the products that they sell to customers in nonU.S. geographic territories.
Most importantly, this means that the
activities of these personnel directly benefit, and
are carried out for and on behalf of, multiple
group members, thereby representing the joint
production of products by these multiple group
members. Also, in many cases the products being
physically produced by contract manufacturers
will not be identified as being produced for, or
owned by, any specific group member until either
late in the production process or until they’ve
been packed for shipment to a customer.

What are these joint production activities and
functions that are short of actual physical
14
production? They include, for example:
1. oversight and direction of production
activities;
2. material selection, vendor selection,
control of raw materials, work-in-process,
or finished goods;
3. management of manufacturing costs or
capacities;
4. control of manufacturing-related
logistics; and
5. quality control.
With two or more group members involved in
joint production, the IRC’s partnership rules,
regulations, and a litany of case law come into
play. In short, joint production activities are more
than enough to create a partnership for U.S. tax
purposes. This finding of a partnership will be
even more obvious when there is a central
management function (including product sales
management) that presents the group’s business
to customers, distributors, and others as one
seamless worldwide business and that makes
innumerable business decisions affecting that
business (for example, determining production
quantities, terms for transactions with third
parties, and product pricing).
Interested readers may refer to our previously
cited article for an explanation of how a profitshifting structure may create a partnership for
U.S. tax purposes.15 In short, that article notes that
many profit-shifting structures involve one
worldwide, centrally managed and conducted
business, the operations and transactions of
which have been separated into multiple group
members with each member conducting defined
portions of that business. The article explains how
in many cases the group members are partners in
an unacknowledged partnership for U.S. tax

14

13

For considerable discussion of these developments and their effects
on cross-border commerce, see OECD, “Tax Challenges Arising From
Digitalisation – Interim Report 2018: Inclusive Framework on BEPS,” in
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD Publishing,
Paris). See also Section II of Kadet, “BEPS: A Primer on Where It Came
From and Where It’s Going,” Tax Notes, Feb. 15, 2016, p. 793.
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See reg. section 1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)(b), which is the source for this
listing. While in some cases there will be overlap with research and
development work, these production activities and functions are in fact
separate from R&D. Thus, special rules governing R&D such as the costsharing agreement regulations and the entity classification rules do not
apply. See reg. sections 1.482-7(j)(2)(iii) and 301.7701-1(c).
15

See Kadet and Koontz, “Profit-Shifting Structures and Unexpected
Partnership Status,” supra note 3.
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purposes. Suffice it to say that the existence of a
partnership, while not a necessity, simply makes
the application by the IRS of ECI taxation more
16
certain and considerably easier to implement.
Once there is a partnership with the relevant
U.S. and foreign group members as partners, all
joint activities and related revenue and expenses
are considered to be conducted, earned, and
incurred within the partnership and no longer
conducted, earned, and incurred by any of the
17
partners. This means that the relevant low-taxed
foreign member or members are partners in a
partnership that is conducting a trade or business
within the United States that is partially or wholly
producing inventory property in the United
States for sale outside the United States.18 Under
these circumstances, low-taxed foreign member
partners will be treated as engaging in a trade or
business within the United States19 and will have
some amount of ECI, for which they must file
Form 1120-F (U.S. Income Tax Return of a Foreign
Corporation) and pay applicable U.S. corporate
income tax. The partnership must apply section
1446 withholding tax.
It will often be the case that U.S. group
members, acting independently on a regular and
continuing basis, make business decisions and
negotiate and conclude important terms of
contracts on behalf of their low-taxed foreign
members. These independent actions cover
matters such as component and raw material
sourcing, contract manufacturing agreements,
production planning, overseeing the
manufacturing process, and quality control. Thus,
even if no partnership exists for tax purposes, the

16

The authors are unaware of any IRS attempt to assert an
unintended partnership in a profit-shifting structure. However, the
actual facts regarding how members of some groups operate joint
businesses might be so strong that those groups may, after a careful
review, conclude that a partnership exists for tax purposes and act
accordingly.
17

See LTR 201305006.

18

Note that under the code, regulations, and case law, there will still
be a partnership with production occurring within the United States
even when the partnership activities are limited to joint production with
each partner taking its share of production as a distribution in kind for
sale by that partner. Thus, although many centrally managed groups
conducting joint production also direct and conduct sales activities
centrally, the performance of these centrally directed sales activities are
not necessary for the results described in this article.
19

See section 875(1). Activities conducted within the United States
will usually be more than sufficient to cause a permanent establishment
when a tax treaty applies.

1124

facts may establish that U.S. group members are
de facto agents acting on behalf of their low-taxed
foreign members, thereby creating a trade or
business within the United States with some
amount of ECI. De facto agency status is sufficient
to meet the “trade or business in the United
States” test for application of the ECI rules.
C. Before TCJA
Section 863(b) and relevant regulations in
effect before the TCJA provide for sourcing of
applicable gross income from production and
sales by attributing one portion to production
activity and the remainder to sales activity. While
20
not the only method set out in the regulations, a
commonly used approach is the 50/50 method,
under which gross income is apportioned onehalf to production activity and one-half to sales
activity. While the production activity portion is
sourced based on the location of production
21
assets, the sales activity portion is governed by
the long-standing sourcing rule that looks to the
country in which the sale occurs — the title
22
passage rule. Under those rules, even if a
product was wholly produced within the United
States and no actual sales activities were
performed by the taxpayer outside the United
States, one-half of the gross income was treated as
foreign source as long as the sale was foreign
source under the title passage rule. This is the
costly loophole that the TCJA section 863(b)
amendment closes.
Consider a profit-shifting structure in which a
low-taxed foreign member and one or more other
group members are partners in a partnership that
manufactures and sells inventory property. Most
likely the structure was created, of course, with
the group’s management and its advisers either
ignoring or overlooking the very real possibility
that their jointly conducted business activities
have created a partnership for U.S. tax purposes.
(Even if no partnership was found to exist for tax
purposes, there would likely be a de facto agency
relationship between the low-taxed foreign
member and one or more U.S. group members

20
21
22

See reg. section 1.863-3(b) and (g)(2).
See reg. section 1.863-3(c)(1) and (g)(2).
See reg. sections 1.863-3(c)(2), (g)(2), and 1.861-7(c).
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acting on its behalf.) Except as noted in the below
discussion, this partnership conducts all
production activities within the United States and
sells the inventory property both within and
outside the United States. Assume also that
physical production of the inventory property is
performed by an unrelated contract manufacturer
outside the United States.
Under the pre-TCJA sourcing rules, and using
the 50/50 method, the gross income from foreign
sales would result in 50 percent of the gross profit
being U.S. source and 50 percent being foreign
source.23 This has the following consequences for
the low-taxed foreign member partner:
1. Because the U.S.-source income is ECI at
the partnership level,24 the portion of ECI
allocable under section 704 to the lowtaxed foreign member partner is subject to
both section 1446 withholding and normal
corporate taxation at a rate of up to 35
25
percent. The 30 percent section 884
branch profits tax would also apply if not
reduced or eliminated under an applicable
tax treaty.

be currently taxable under subpart F to the
U.S. shareholder.27
D. After TCJA
Once the TCJA is effective, changes that will
affect the above-described profit-shifting
structure include:
1. sourcing of income from covered
inventory property transactions solely to
the location or locations of production
(section 863(b) amendment);
2. taxation of GILTI; and
3. reduction of the corporate tax rate to a
flat 21 percent rate from its previous rates
of up to 35 percent.
These changes result in the following
consequences for the low-taxed foreign member
partner:
1. With a finding that all the partnership’s
production activities are conducted within
the United States (the related contract
manufacturer’s assets and activities
outside the United States are ignored for
this purpose because they are not assets of
the partnership, but rather assets of the
contract manufacturer), the full gross
income from product sales will be U.S.28
source income and ECI at the partnership
level. As with the pre-TCJA situation
described above, the portion of ECI
allocable under section 704 to the lowtaxed foreign member partner will be
subject to section 1446 withholding;

2. When the low-taxed foreign member
partner is a CFC, the manufacturing
26
branch rule will likely apply to cause
some portion of the partnership’s foreignsource income allocable to that partner to

27

23

Note that the assets of the contract manufacturer outside the
United States do not affect the source of income from production
activities. Thus, under these assumed facts, all 50 percent of the gross
profits from production activities are U.S. source.
24

See section 864(c)(3).

25

See discussion in prior articles listed in supra note 3, covering both
the potential loss of deductions and credits under section 882(c)(2) and
open statute of limitations under section 6501(c)(3) when the low-taxed
foreign member has not filed a tax return for a prior year.
26

See reg. section 1.954-3(b)(1)(ii).
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In brief, with the manufacturing branch being in the United States,
the manufacturing branch rule (reg. section 1.954-3(b)(1)(ii)(b)) is
applied comparing the effective tax rate on the relevant foreign-source
sales income with 30 percent. This 30 percent is the lower of 90 percent
of, or 5 percentage points less than, the 35 percent U.S. tax rate. With the
profit-shifting structure minimizing the imposition of foreign taxes to
very low rates, the manufacturing branch rule should apply to relevant
foreign sales that are otherwise caught by the section 954(d)(1) definition
of foreign base company sales income (FBCSI). Note also that not all
foreign-source income will be FBCSI. For example, if the partnership or
the low-taxed foreign member partner has a sales office in Singapore,
inventory property sold for use, consumption, or disposition within
Singapore would not be caught by the section 954(d)(1) FBCSI definition.
However, sales into nearby Malaysia where there is no sales office would
be caught.
28

The facts in this example assume that 100 percent of production
activities occur within the United States. When the partnership conducts
production activities and holds production assets outside the United
States, some portion would be foreign source and avoid ECI taxation.
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normal corporate taxation, though now at
the 21 percent flat rate; and the 30
percent section 884 branch profits tax if
applicable.
2. Because all gross income in this example
is caught by the new section 863(b)
sourcing rule and is therefore ECI, none of
that income will be subject to the new
29
GILTI rules when they would otherwise
apply to a U.S. shareholder because the
low-taxed foreign member is a CFC. The
GILTI rules (as well as the subpart F rules),
of course, recognize that when a CFC is
taxable on ECI, there is no need to include
that already taxed income in the income of
any U.S. shareholder.
The above consequences assume that 100
percent of the production activities occurred in
the United States. Say instead that 25 percent of
the partnership’s production assets are located
outside the United States, thereby causing 25
percent of the gross income from product sales to
30
be foreign source. That would cause that portion
of gross income to escape ECI taxation.
Assuming the low-taxed foreign member is a
CFC, either the above-mentioned subpart F
manufacturing branch rule or the GILTI rules
would apply to its U.S. shareholders regarding
the 25 percent of gross income that is foreign
source. In short, the manufacturing branch rule
could conceivably apply, with its application
depending on the tax rate in the country where
the partial manufacturing takes place and the
effective tax rate paid on that income. When the
manufacturing branch rule doesn’t apply, the
income would be included in the U.S.
shareholder’s GILTI computation. As for the
applicable U.S. tax rate, when subpart F applies, it
would be the flat 21 percent rate. When GILTI

29

See sections 951A(c)(2)(A)(i)(I) and 952(b).

applies, the flat 21 percent rate is cut roughly in
half. In either case, if foreign taxes have been paid,
31
there would be some amount of FTC.
III. Foreign Producer Sales Into the United States
The above sections of this article have focused
on profit shifting conducted by groups having
one or more low-taxed foreign members that
partially or wholly produce products within the
United States. The new section 863(b) sourcing
rule will also affect legitimate foreign producers
that sell their fully foreign-manufactured
products into the United States.
Traditional tax planning wisdom has typically
discouraged producers from setting up sales
branches to sell their manufactured products
within other countries. This has been true for
various nontax reasons, including the desire to
secure limited liability protection that shields the
group from excessive legal risks arising from local
operations. Thus, when a producer from one
country desires to set up its own distribution or
other sales support network that goes beyond
some limited functions such as market research
(in which case the foreign producer might
establish a representative office), it will most
commonly establish a local subsidiary. One
important tax reason for this traditional planning
is to establish a more secure transfer price that
will better delineate the income attributable to the
local sales and distribution functions. The foreign
producer wants to minimize the risk that the local
country will claim that some portion of the
income attributable to production intangibles and
the production process itself becomes a part of
that local country’s tax base.
In brief, the use of a local subsidiary for the sale
and distribution of products results in
intercompany transactions that are reflected in
legally enforceable contracts and other documents
between group members. In contrast, when a
foreign producer maintains a sales branch, there is
an intracompany home office/branch transfer value
that has only internally generated management
documentation for support. Despite the self-serving
nature of these legally enforceable contracts and

30

See reg. section 1.863-3(c)(1) and (g)(2). Current regulations provide
that the adjusted basis of production assets located within and outside
the United States shall be used to determine U.S.-source and foreignsource income from production activities. New regulations under
section 863(b) that may be issued could set out other factors to determine
source.
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See section 960, including new section 960(d) added by the TCJA to
allow a partial FTC for GILTI.
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documents, tax authorities understandably give
them more credibility than the internally generated
documentation.
For purposes of illustration, assume that a
foreign widget producer has manufacturing and
related administration costs of $50. It then sells
the widget at a price of $80 to its U.S. sales
subsidiary, which in turn sells the widget to a
customer for $100, incurring $10 of local expenses
in the process. This leaves groupwide profit of $40
with $30 of profit in the foreign producer, which
reflects the value of production including
production intangibles; and $10 of profit in the
U.S. sales subsidiary, which reflects the value of
sales and distribution functions including local
marketing intangibles. Assume that title transfers
from the foreign producer to the U.S. subsidiary
when the products are physically within the
United States.
Before the new section 863(b) amendment, the
title passage rule would govern the source of the
foreign widget producer’s gross income that is
attributable to its sales activity. Thus, some
portion of the producer’s gross income would be
U.S. source. Despite this U.S.-source status, the
producer would under normal circumstances
avoid any U.S. tax because the producer has
neither a trade or business in the United States nor
a permanent establishment under any tax treaty
that might be applicable. This means that the
United States would only tax the $10 of profit
recorded within the sales subsidiary, allowing the
foreign widget producer to protect its $30 of
manufacturing profit from U.S. taxation (ignoring
of course the potential for transfer pricing
adjustments).
With the new section 863(b) sourcing rule for
manufactured inventory property, 100 percent of
the gross income from sales into the United States
by foreign-based manufacturers will now be
foreign source. For our foreign widget producer
selling to its U.S. sales subsidiary at $80, this
means that none of its $30 of profits would be ECI,
even if the producer were found to be conducting
a trade or business in the United States or to have
a PE under an applicable tax treaty.
Say that before the section 863(b) amendment,
the foreign widget producer had been selling into
the United States through a U.S. sales branch
rather than the assumed local subsidiary. With
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this conduct of a trade or business within the
United States and some amount of U.S.-source
gross income as determined under the section
863(b) regulations, it would have been taxable in
the United States on some portion of its $40 of
groupwide profits.
Now, with the section 863(b) amendment, the
foreign widget producer will have zero U.S.source gross income, meaning that all the profit of
$40 will escape ECI taxation. As a corollary, of
course, with all gross income being foreign
source, the expenses of the sales branch
attributable to it could not be attributed to and
deductible against any other ECI that the widget
producer might have from other activities it
conducts in the United States.
Given the foregoing, traditional tax planning
may no longer apply to foreign producers that
wish to set up their own sales and distribution
operations in the United States. For example,
when a foreign producer’s home country exempts
from taxation or taxes the profits of a foreign sales
branch at very reduced rates, there will be an
incentive to sell into the United States through
such a branch — that incentive being little or no
home country tax and no U.S. tax.
What other incentive might there be? Say that
a foreign producer with a U.S. sales subsidiary
has material intercompany sales that it believes
are at some risk of a transfer pricing adjustment.32
If it were to transition in some manner to a sales
branch structure, the sourcing based solely on
location of production would cause complete
nontaxability, thereby sidestepping for the future
any ongoing transfer pricing risk.
Needless to say, when an existing sales or
distribution subsidiary holds marketing rights
and intangibles, any restructuring may have
significant transfer pricing, legal ramifications,
and other consequences from their transfer, all of
which are outside the scope of this article.
However, when a foreign producer is initiating its
own sales or distribution operations for the first
time or is initiating separate operations for a new
product line so that there is no transfer of exiting

32

An excellent example of a foreign producer that received IRS
attention is GlaxoSmithKline Holdings (Americas) Inc. See IR-2006-142.
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marketing rights or intangibles, establishing a
sales branch should carry little or no U.S. tax risk.
U.S. groups in their profit-shifting structures
have made aggressive use of the check-the-box
33
rules to create hybrid entities that avoid or
minimize tax in the foreign countries in which they
operate. Also, the simple check-the-box rules allow
foreign producers to create hybrid entities for U.S.
sales and distribution operations that would be
separate taxpayers under their home country tax
rules and disregarded entity (DRE) subsidiaries
under the U.S. tax rules. With DRE status and the
new section 863(b) source rule, foreign producers
would be able to easily avoid both their home
country tax and U.S. tax. Treasury may need to
consider issuing future antiabuse rules that would
override such structures.
The above discussion covers only domestic U.S.
rules. When a foreign producer is covered by a tax
treaty with the United States, there could potentially
be treaty terms that define source, though in general,
treaties do not act to increase the tax that would be
due in excess of amounts otherwise owed under
domestic law. The potential applicability of any
sourcing rule as well as the implications of having a
PE under a treaty would require separate
investigation.
IV. Intangible Products
This article has been written primarily with
the production and sale of tangible products in
mind. There are, however, many intangible
products sold with one multinational group both
producing and selling the product. An obvious
example of such a product is software, which
under the terms of reg. section 1.861-18 can be
treated as the sale or exchange of a product when
34
provided to customers. Any other intangible
products included within the section 865(i)(1)
definition of inventory property would also fall
into this category.

V. Effect on Transition Tax
With the transition from the former deferral
system to the new territorial participation
exemption system mandated by the TCJA, section
965 imposes a one-time tax on accumulated post1986 deferred foreign income on U.S. shareholders,
payable at the election of the taxpayer in eight
annual installments. Say that a U.S. shareholder of a
zero- or low-taxed CFC has been making
installment payments regarding that CFC’s
accumulated post-1986 deferred foreign income.
Later, it is determined that for specific pre-TCJA
years the CFC conducted a trade or business within
the United States and had ECI subject to normal U.S.
taxation.
In that event, with the determination that
some portion of the CFC’s accumulated post-1986
deferred foreign income is attributable to ECI, the
tax base for the one-time transition tax would be
35
adjusted downward.
VI. Needed Amendment of Regulations
The amendment of section 863(b) requires at a
minimum that changes be made to reg. section
1.863-3 to explain and define how the new law is
to be applied. This will provide an opportunity to
modernize this regulation and others to reflect the
business models now commonly used that did not
exist many decades ago when the existing
36
regulations were issued.
Reg. section 1.863-3 now uses the adjusted
basis and location of production assets owned by
a taxpayer to determine the source of income from
production activities. New business models have
centralized production activities as well as
production decision-making and management
functions in the United States while relying on
third-party contract manufacturers often located
outside the United States. This creates an urgent
need to update the section 863(b) sourcing rules.
This update could both more fully define what
should be considered as inventory property
produced by a taxpayer and identify the factor or
factors that would determine source. Any new
rules that address business models using contract

33

Reg. section 301.7701-1 to -3.

34

See reg. section 1.861-18(f)(2), which provides that section 863 will
apply when appropriate to determine the source of income from
transactions classified as sales or exchanges of copyrighted articles. See
also examples 3, 5, 6, and 7 and the related discussion in Kadet, supra
note 3.
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See section 965(d)(2)(A).

36

Several specific suggestions for updating existing regulations were
included in Kadet and Koontz, supra note 12.
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manufacturers should be consistent with reg.
section 1.954-3(a)(4)(iv), which was amended
effective from 2009 to focus on such business
37
models for purposes of subpart F. Because
contract manufacturing has been an important
part of business models and profit-shifting
structures for several decades now, it is long past
the time to make similar changes to the ECI and
sourcing rules. Modernization should include the
production and sale of intangibles such as
software. Antiabuse rules could also be amended
to reflect today’s profit-shifting structures as well
as to cover possible new structures such as those
mentioned in the above section on foreign
producer sales into the United States.
VII. Concluding Comments
In addition to the new sourcing rule applicable
to both domestic and foreign taxpayers, the above
discussion has highlighted several significant TCJA
changes to the code, including a lower corporate tax
rate, the participation exemption, and the GILTI
provisions. But much has not changed. In short,
although an oversimplification, it’s fair to say that
much of the code and its myriad rules have
remained basically intact while some new
complicated layers have been added. This lack of
change means that the existing ECI provisions are
very much a constant for all years, whether pre- or
38
post-TCJA. The move from the prior deferral
system to the new territorial participation
exemption system does not change this one iota,
except for the new sourcing of income rule.
The IRS has made clear over the past few years
that it does not like and is willing to challenge
many profit-shifting structures now used by
multinational companies. In doing so it has
primarily used as tools either transfer pricing or
recharacterization, both of which are subjective
and carry considerable uncertainty of success in

39

the inevitable litigation process. In contrast,
when the facts support it, the existence of a
partnership for tax purposes and the
determination of ECI are relatively objective.
The authors have seen no evidence to date that
the IRS has attempted to counter the effects of profitshifting structures through application of the ECI
rules. If the IRS should decide to apply ECI in the
future, taxpayers are unlikely to be able to rely on
the statute of limitations to prevent application of
the ECI rules to prior tax years. This is because for
any tax years that the low-taxed foreign member
failed to file its own separate tax return, those years
remain open to examination. Low-taxed foreign
members would not, of course, have been eligible to
join with their U.S. affiliated group in the filing of a
consolidated tax return. This means that when the
facts justify it, the IRS has the authority to look back
many years and assess tax, interest, and penalties.
Unless a low-taxed foreign member actually filed
Form 1120-F for a prior year that started the running
of the statute of limitations for that year, that prior
year will still be open. That is true even if that year
40
has already closed for the U.S. affiliated group.
Despite no apparent evidence of the
application of ECI taxation to multinational
profit-shifting structures, there is evidence that
the IRS believes that ECI taxation is relevant and
worth an increased investment in manpower and
training. This is supported by the Form 1120-F
nonfiler campaign included in the January 31,
2017, rollout of the IRS Large Business and
International Division’s initial 13 campaigns.
Considering the above, we recommend that
multinationals using the types of profit-shifting
structures discussed in this article and our previous
articles reassess their facts and circumstances and
consider whether such structures should be
continued, modified to better align profits with
41
value creation, or unwound.
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Over the past several years, Tax Notes has included numerous
articles and documents concerning ongoing IRS and taxpayer disputes,
including those with Microsoft, Facebook, and Caterpillar.
37

In brief, reg. section 1.954-3(a)(4)(iv) provides rules for determining
whether personal property sold by a CFC will be considered to have
been manufactured, produced, or constructed by that CFC when the
physical manufacturing, producing, and construction activities are not
performed by the CFC. See also T.D. 9438.
38

The TCJA affects ECI taxation through the section 863(b) change
discussed herein and even expanded it through the addition of section
864(c)(8) concerning the sale or exchange of some partnership interests.
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40

See section 6501(c)(3).

41

For the discussion and recommendations provided for groups and
their outside auditors, see Kelly, Koontz, and Kadet, “Profit Shifting:
Effectively Connected Income and Financial Statement Risks,” supra note
3, and Kadet and Koontz, “Profit-Shifting Structures: Making Ethical
Judgments Objectively, Part 1,” supra note 3. The latter article proposes
an ethical benchmark that multinationals can use to objectively test the
propriety of their profit-shifting structures.
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